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Abstract
We construct a spatial equilibrium model with endogenous air pollution as a by-product of
production and consumption, where spatially mobile skilled and unskilled workers are affected
negatively but heterogeneously by air pollution. Using a calibrated version of the model based
on data for China in 2010, we show that strict regulation can be a centripetal force that attracts
workers and production toward the regulated place, while reducing the local and overall emission
of pollutants. This result is in contrast to the insights of traditional theories that see environ-
mental regulation as a centrifugal force for the local economy. The migration of workers who
care environmental quality, input-output linkages in domestic trade networks, and openness to
international trade, work in the mechanism delivering this result. We then consider a hypothetical
policy to reduce national industrial emission by 10 percent and compare strategies on how to
allocate reduction responsibilities across cities. We find that concentrating responsibility in a
limited number of rich cities may outperform a more equal allocation in terms of welfare and
economic output.
Keywords: China, Air Pollution, Domesticmigration, Spatial equilibriummodel, Environmental
regulation
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1 Introduction
Air pollution is one of the leading causes of death and health problems in the current world.1
Low and middle-income countries are substantially more polluted than richer countries, and the
mortality due to air pollution concentrates in those countries. China is one of the most severely
affected countries by air pollution along with India. For example, it accounts for 25-30 percent
of global mortality from air pollution in 2015 (Landrigan et al. 2017). Thus, as when Chinese
Premier Li Keqiang declared "war against pollution" in his 2014 statement, the leaders of the
Chinese government also prioritize this issue.
In principle, air pollution is a negative externality, and internalizing it through regulation
is welfare-enhancing. At the same time, environmental regulation is traditionally viewed as a
cost to the local economy and it works as a centrifugal force to drive industries out from the
regulated regions. However, these mechanisms may not necessarily be simple in an economy
with many interconnected regions. China is a large country with a great regional diversity, where
workers and firms move across regions. Also, regions in China are tied via input-output linkages
and a local shock may propagate to other regions. Since environmental regulations affect local
factor prices as well as amenities, the effect of regulation does not rest only within the regulated
place: it may change the prices, industrial composition, and factor allocations of other regions.
Therefore, the net impact of environmental regulation on the local and nationwide outcomes will
depend on many things, and are not readily obvious.
To understand the impact of environmental regulation in this complex spatial context, this
paper proposes a spatial general equilibrium framework in which air pollution is endogenous as
a by-product of production and consumption. By incorporating a standard trade economy model
plus pollution by Copeland and Taylor (2004) and spatial equilibrium models similar to those of
(Redding and Rossi-Hansberg 2017; Caliendo et al. 2018; Faber and Gaubert 2019), our model
allows analysis of how a local or aggregate shock from pollution control regulations spatially
propagates through trade and migration linkages. Using the model with an arbitrary number of
1. See https://www.who.int/airpollution/en/.
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cities that is calibrated to the data of China as of 2010, we conduct various policy simulations
to understand the potential effects of local and national environmental policy at aggregated and
disaggregated levels.
The key contribution of this paper is that we demonstrate that the mobility of heterogeneous
workersmatters in determining the aggregate and distributional impact of environmental policies.
Departing from the conventional theories in the literature of environment and trade, we introduce
mobile workers who have heterogeneous tastes with regard to environmental quality. Thanks
to this extension, we obtain several results that may contradict to traditional and popular views
on how local environmental policy affect the regional economy and environment. For example,
we find that there are cases where stricter environmental policies may be beneficial not only for
the local air quality but also for the local economy. In addition, we also show that the same
environmental policy can have different nationwide implications depending on the place where
such policy is implemented. In some cases, spatially uneven policies may have greater welfare
benefit than a uniform policies if we take the people’s responses through migration into account.
The model has three production sectors, namely, agriculture, manufacturing, and services.
Among these, we regard the manufacturing sector as the polluting sector, respecting the fact
that the majority of the anthropogenically contributed air pollution comes from manufacturing
emissions in China. To represent the complex mixture of regulatory tools used in local envi-
ronmental control, we introduce a Pigouvian emission tax for industrial emissions that is set by
local government to regulate local firms’ emissions of air pollutants. This setting of endogenous
pollution from the production side echoes the standard analytical framework that decomposes
local emissions of pollutants into the scale (size) of the local economy, the composition of local
industries, and the environmental technology of local producers (Grossman and Krueger 1995;
Copeland and Taylor 2004). Quite intuitively, the model has the feature that the local emission
increases with any increase in the size of the local economy, the rise of manufacturing sector’s
share in the economy, and the lower that environmental technology is (i.e. more emissions from
a unit of manufacturing value of production).
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In contrast to traditional analyses on the spatial distribution of air pollution in an international
economy context (e.g. Copeland and Taylor 1994; Hubbard 2014), our model of the domestic
spatial economy allows for the migration of workers across cities in China. Workers choose cities
in which their welfare is maximised, and thus the expected welfare for each type is equalised in
the equilibrium, following the tradition of Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982). Workers include
air pollution as an local amenity in their welfare evaluation. A growing literature that reveals the
demand from Chinese citizens for better ambient quality motivates us to explicitly introduce air
pollution in our welfare specification. For example, studies on the hedonic pricing of housing
show that people value air quality in their choice of housing location (Zheng, Fu, and Liu 2009;
Zheng, Kahn, and Liu 2010; Zheng, Cao, and Kahn 2011; Zheng and Kahn 2013). Ito and
Zhang (2016) use indoor air purifier purchase data between 2006 to 2012 to estimate the revealed
willingness to pay (WTP) for reductions in exposure to air pollution as measured by PM10.2
Freeman et al. (2017) use exogenous variations in PM2.5 generated by the power plants in distant
places in a city’s upwind direction and find that people are willing to give up substantial amounts
ofmoney to breathe clean air.3 Chen, Oliva, and Zhang (2017) quantify the impact of air pollution
on domestic migration in China, using the strength of thermal inversion as the exogenous source
of variations in local air pollution. Their data also show that migrants head to cities with better
air quality, holding other factors associated with the city’s attractiveness constant.4
Furthermore, our model is novel because it introduces heterogeneous workers, divided into
skilled and unskilled, and face different factor demands by firms. Their preferences also differ
in terms of tastes on environmental quality, therefore, the skilled and unskilled are harmed
differently by air pollution. The recent empirical literature reveals that skilled and unskilled
workers have different tastes for amenity and this difference matters in determining which city
2. Their preferred estimates of theWTP to reduce PM10 by one unit for five years range fromUSD4.40 to USD5.46
per household (in 2005 exchange rate).
3. According to their main estimates, a one-unit decline in PM2.5 in 2005 was worth USD 8.3 billion for the whole
of China.
4. Thermal inversion is a meteorological phenomenon that reverses the normal relationship between altitude and
air temperature. When it happens, air temperature in the upper-altitude is higher than that at the lower-altitudes. This
is known as a typical climatic cause that worsens air pollution and they use the thermal inversion defined as above as
an instrumental variable for the local level of air pollution.
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they choose to live, through the balancing of their income and the cost of accessing preferred
local amenities (i.e. housing cost). Moretti (2013), for example, finds that skilled labor in the
U.S. will pay higher living costs than the unskilled to live in cities with superior amenity. In
the context of urban air pollution in China, Chen, Oliva, and Zhang (2017) find that skilled
labor more elastically responds to the level of air pollution. According to their estimates, the
magnitude of the effect of a 1 `6/<3 increase in PM2.5 in the air on the net-migration ratio (in
percent) for college graduates or above is 0.9314 while it is 0.4723 for junior-high graduates or
below.
Thanks to these extensions introduced in our model, we obtain interesting insights on the
spatial impacts of local environmental policy that are different from the conventional views.
The conventional view on the spatial impact of environmental regulation is the pollution haven
effect (PHE) (Copeland and Taylor 2004), which asserts that strengthening local regulations will
relocate polluting industries from the regulated region to other regions with laxer policies. This
intuitively straightforward prediction is doubly undesirable for policy makers because stronger
regulation hurts the local economic output, and because the effectiveness of regulation in reducing
pollution is somewhat offset by increased emissions outside of the regulated region. We examine
how this PHE emerges in our model, and find that a stronger local regulation does not always
result in a pollution haven. While a unilateral increase in emission tax in a city definitely raises the
production costs there that reduces the competitiveness of local industry, however, the improved
air quality in the city as well as the substitution effects among factors may however result in
a relocation of workers towards the city with stricter regulations. This enhances the services
sector production in the city and raises its real GDP. Moreover, the PHE outside of the city is
substantially weakened.
Another feature that is important in the model is its flexible treatment of openness to inter-
national trade. Trade openness has important implications for how local regulations affect the
spatial distribution of pollution within a country. Specifically, eliminating international trade
tends to exaggerate PHE in the domestic economy, suggesting the importance of including the
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foreign market even in the case where the main focus of analysis is the distribution within a
country. With international trade, the increased production cost from tougher regulation in a city
results in an increase in the import of polluting varieties from foreign countries, which in turn
suppresses the positive demand effect for polluting varieties from domestic suppliers. In other
words, the PHE that takes place in the international arena weakens the PHE within a domestic
economy. In short, more international openness is associated with a less pronounced PHE in the
domestic sphere.
We then apply the model to a few policy analyses relevant to the real situation in China.
Every five years, China sets a national reduction target for the aggregate industrial emission of
pollutants as one of the policy targets in the Five-Year-Plan (FYP). This target is decomposed into
sub-national reduction responsibilities that Provinces and prefecture-level cities try to achieve. In
reality, the central government of China assigns different magnitudes of reduction responsibility
(0-30 percent) across regions and cities to achieve the national target (10 percent, in 2010) as
a sum of these regional reduction efforts. Reflecting this fact, we compare different spatial
allocation strategies of reduction responsibility that achieve the same 10 percent national level
reduction. Overall, our simulation suggests that a 10 percent reduction of aggregate emissions is
likely improve the welfare of both skilled and unskilled labor. Compared to the reference strategy
that assigns a uniform reduction magnitude to all, some strategies with uneven allocations are
found to be more welfare-enhancing.
In addition, we find that the national 10 percent reduction policymay have a different effect on
skilled workers and unskilled workers. On average, skilled workers receive a negative impact on
their real incomewhile unskilledworkers enjoy economic gains, across all the allocation strategies
compared. For most of the strategies, negative impacts on average real GDP are achieved by
this national reduction policy, but their magnitude is tiny. There is only a 0 to -0.2 percent
change of aggregate real GDP required to achieve a 10 percent reduction in aggregate industrial
emissions. Surprisingly, a particular strategy that concentrates reduction responsibility in a
limited number of richer coastal cities exhibits a positive return to aggregate real GDP, meaning
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that economically costly regulation can generate economic benefits through the reallocation of
resources across space. We repeat the same exercises assuming an autarkic China where no
international trade takes place. The results show that in the absence of international trade, the
welfare effect for skilled worker is larger while that for unskilled workers is lower compared to
the case with international trade.
While some of our results observe positive economic returns as a result of stricter regulations,
our model rules out any direct mechanisms that bring economic benefit from the regulations sug-
gested by some literature. For example, Porter and Linde (1995) argue that strict environmental
regulation may induce industrial firms to invest in cleaner technology that is more productive.
As a result, the implementation of regulation boosts aggregate productivity. In addition, the
emerging empirical literature provides rich evidence about the direct effect of air pollution on
worker productivity. As one of the latest examples from China, He, Liu, and Salvo (2019) exploit
exogenous variations in exposure to PM2.5 to find its negative impact on the productivity of
industrial workers in Chinese towns.5 However, our approach intentionally excludes the direct
productivity effects of regulation and discusses the impact of regulations purely from the cost
point of view for each individual firm, so that we could focus on the implications of spatial
reallocation in determining the economic and welfare outcomes of environmental regulation.
Our framework contributes to the literature of economic geography from a number of per-
spectives. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to incorporate local air pollution
and a heterogeneous labor force into a quantitative spatial equilibrium model. Desmet and
Rossi-hansberg (2015) are predecessors who incorporate the environmental issue into spatial
general equilibrium framework, but they focus on global warming where the impact of emissions
works globally, without taking into account workers’ heterogeneity. Balboni (2016) studies the
spatial distribution of economic activity affected by road infrastructure and localized impact of
environment (sea level rise on the Vietnamese coast due to global warming), however the envi-
ronment (global warming) is exogenous in her setting. Our approach is novel in that it deals with
5. See Zivin and Neidell (2018) for a short summary of global evidence in this regard.
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endogenous environmental externalities in a spatial equilibrium framework where heterogeneous
workers can migrate across regions and sectors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical model and
Section 3 summarizes the data and calibration procedures. We explain themodel properties using
numerical simulations of unilateral pollution control policy in Section 4. Section 5 describes
how the model evaluate nationwide reduction target policies and compares different strategies of
spatial responsibility allocation. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Our purpose is to build a quantitative model of the Chinese economy with endogenous air
pollution. As motivated in the previous section, our interest rests in the spatial difference of
economic activity and air pollution within China. Therefore, the model accommodates a total of
# locations, consisting of # − 1 locations in China and a single consolidated external location,
the rest of the world (RoW). Locations in China, called "cities" in the rest of the paper, are
denoted with index = (or 8) ∈ C. For the set of all locations in the model, including the RoWW
is used for the notation.
Preference To understand the heterogeneous impact of environmental policy across different
type of people, we assume that the economy is populated with two types of labor, skilled and
unskilled workers. We take this dichotomous setting for workers’ heterogeneity for the benefit
of analytical tractability and calibration of the model to the data. Specifically, since the skill
variable in our data is educational attainment, discrete categorization of the skill levels fits well
in this context.
The number of skilled workers in = is denoted by !:=. The unskilled counterpart in = is !D=.
The total supply of workers of type C ∈ {:, D} is fixed, denoted by !CC ≡
∑
=∈C !
C
=. A worker ]
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of type C ∈ {:, D}’s preference
*C= (]) = YC= (])0C (=)C=C= (1)
where:
0C (=) = exp(−bC=) (2)
captures utility loss from ambient pollution in =, = > 0. We assume that a skilled worker is
more sensitive to pollution, b: > bD , consistent with empirical findings such as Chen, Oliva, and
Zhang (2017). YC= (]) is a Fréchet distributed idiosyncratic preference for city = by a type C worker
], defined over all = ∈ C for each individual worker. The distribution function is identical for all
locations, with mean 1 and dispersion parameter [C . C= is the average valuation of location =’s
exogenous amenity other than air pollution by type C workers.
Workers consume housing  , traded agricultural goods  , traded manufacturing goods
" , and non-traded services ( .  is supplied and consumed only within the same =. For
simplicity,  is the land whose supply is a fixed local endowment. The preference over goods
is assumed to be;
C= =
©­­«
1
U

∑
9=,",(
(C9 ,=)
d−1
d

d
d−1 ª®®¬
U (
C
 ,=
1 − U
)1−U
(3)
where d > 1 and U ∈ (0, 1). Workers of both types spend a constant fraction U of their income
on goods and services other than housing. The expenditure shares within the non-housing
goods are not constant and depend on local relative prices. Let % 9 ,= denote the local prices
of the 9 (∈ {, ", (}) sector goods in =. Then, the CES preference on manufacturing and
traded services (the first parenthesis of (3)) ensures that the expenditure share on 9-sector goods
becomes Uj 9 ,=, where j 9 ,= ≡
%
1−d
9,=
%
1−d
) ,=
and %) ,= =
(
%
1−d
,=
+ %1−d
",=
+ %1−d
(,=
) 1
1−d . This assumption
allows the expenditure share of non-traded services varies across locations.6 Note that the
6. Note that we assume that the parameters governing the preference over goods expressed in (3) is the same
between skilled and unskilled workers. This means that the consumption share of each category of goods is identical 
between the skilled and the unskilled in the same city =. This is for the sake of simplicity, but does not seem to affect
the qualitative results of the model.
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preference (1) ensures that skilled workers have a higher willingness to pay to reduce their
exposure to air pollution. This is important for the analysis because we are interested in how
environmental regulation works if there are heterogeneous mobile workers who differently value
the environmental quality.
Production Sectors There are three production sectors in the model; (i) a competitive agri-
cultural sector with constant returns to scale technology and zero trade cost between regions in
China, (ii) a manufacturing sector under monopolistic competition with costly domestic trade and
spatial heterogeneity of productivity that generates trade (a Ricardian), and (iii) a competitive
services sector which only serves to the local market. In the model, the manufacturing sector
emits air pollutants, while the other two sectors are assumed to be non-polluting. Traditionally,
the literature on pollution and trade has widely used two-sector models such as that by Copeland
and Taylor (2004) to incorporate the "composition effect" into the analysis. In two-sector models,
there are a modern polluting (industrial) sector and a non-polluting sector. The polluting sector
is subject to environmental regulations, and regulation may affect the industrial composition of
the two sectors through changes in relative factor prices. We assume that the manufacturing
sector is polluting based on the fact that it accounts for the largest share of the emission of
ambient pollutants in China (Zheng and Kahn 2013). However, differently from the traditional
way, we assume two distinctive non-polluting sectors, agriculture and services. In China, both
agriculture and services employ non-negligible shares of the labor force and they are different
in many aspects. Specifically, the agricultural sector mainly employs unskilled labor while the
services sector uses skilled labor more intensively. Given this difference in skill intensiveness,
a two-sector model which aggregates agriculture and services into one single "non-polluting
sector" may oversimplify the reality of the Chinese economy. In addition, the three-sector setting
fits well in our empirical context because the data (output and employment) we use for calibration
report the numbers for these three sectors.
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Agricultural Production We assume that the agricultural sector is traditional and hires only
unskilled labor. For the benefit of simplicity, we further assume that the agricultural output
can be traded without trade cost, so that the price can be normalized to %,= = 1,∀= ∈ W.
Specifically, the production is constant returns to scale and has the following form,
.,= = ,=!
D
,= (4)
where ,= is local productivity shifter. Local endowments such as land area and fertility are
considered to be entered in this productivity shifter. !D
,=
is the employment of unskilled labor
in the agricultural sector in =. Let FD= denote the wage of the unskilled labor, then, in the
equilibrium,
FD= = ,= (5)
Production Technologies in the Manufacturing Sector The production technology of the
manufacturing sector closely follows the Ricardian trade model proposed by Eaton and Kortum
(2002), which have widely been used to study the domestic economic geography (see, Donaldson
and Hornbeck 2016; Caliendo et al. 2018; Faber and Gaubert 2019). There are quite a few
advantages of adopting their model. First, it allows dealing with an arbitrary number of locations
that engage in trade. Second, while the model by Eaton and Kortum (2002) was originally
designed to study international trade where the factors (such as labors) are immobile across
national borders, the model can easily be extended to accommodate the migration of production
factors. Third, the model can directly incorporate the canonical model of pollutant emission of
Copeland and Taylor (2004).
There are infinitesimal intermediate manufacturing varieties in a fixed interval, indexed by
G ∈ [0, 1]. An G-variety firm uses inputs from manufacturing and local services as well as two
types of labors. A local competitive manufacturing final producer combines all the intermediate
varieties that can be sourced from any cities within China and RoW and produce a manufacturing
composite. This local final producer sells the composite to the local final consumers and local
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producers in manufacturing and services. The primary production unit in the manufacturing
sector is the firms that produce manufacturing intermediates. Each of these firms produces
an intermediate variety using a composite of inputs as specified below. Production by the
intermediate firms generates an undesirable by-product, which is called pollutant. To reduce the
emission of pollutant, the firm needs to divert a fraction of its inputs to abatement activities. Net
emissions after abatement are a fraction of the primary gross emission.
Specifically, an intermediate G-variety producer in city = has the following technology.

@",= (G) = [1 − B= (G)] q= (G)",=<̃= (G)
Ĩ",= (G) = _",=q= (G)",=<̃= (G)
I",= (G) = [1 − B= (G)]
1
X Ĩ",= (G)
(6)
where @",= is the output volume, q= (G) is a variety G-specific random variable drawn from a
Fréchet distributionwith shape parameter \̃ andmean 1whoseCDF is given by  (q) = exp[q− \̃ ].
As in Eaton and Kortum (2002), q= (G) represents the efficiency of variety G production in city
=. ",= is a productivity shifter common to all manufacturing sector firms in =. This shifter is
exogenous to individual manufacturing firms. <̃= is the composite of input in Cobb-Douglass
form which is given by
<̃= (G) =
[
;:",= (G)
]W:
"
[
;D",= (G)
]WD
"
[
<"",= (G)
]W"
"
[
<(",= (G)
]W(
" (7)
where ;:
"
, and ;D
"
are skilled labor and unskilled labor inputs, respectively. <"
",=
is the input
of manufactured intermediate goods for manufacturing production, while <(
",=
is the input
from services sector.The technology is constant returns to scale at the firm level with the input
coefficients and satisfies that
∑
9′∈:,D," W
9′
",=
= 1. B= ∈ [0, 1] is the share of input composite
<̃= diverted for the pollution abatement activity. In other words, (1 − B=) of input is kept for the
main production.
The second equation in (6) assumes a simple relationship between the inputs and generated
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pollution. The gross emission before abatement, Ĩ",= (G) is assumed to be proportional to the
total input (<̃",=) the firm uses for its operation. This is a strong but common assumption in
this type of models for the benefit of analytical tractability. _",= > 0 is coefficient that specifies
the relationship between the input and emissions.
The third equation in (6) is for the end-of-pipe abatement technology. I",= refers to net
emissions, which is the pollution that is finally emitted to the environment after abatement. I",=
depends on the gross emission and the abatement effort as measured by the share of the diverted
input for abatement activity (B=). For a given level of Ĩ",=, the net emission is smaller if more
resources are used for abatement (i.e. larger B=). X ∈ (0, 1) is an inverse measure of abatement
efficiency. A higher Xmeans that end-of-pipe technology is less efficient and more final pollution
is emitted for given the potential emission and abatement resources.
Intermediate firms are price takers and perfect competition works in the market. Let FC=, C ∈
{:, D}, be the wages of type C worker, %",= be the price of the final manufacturing composite,
and %(,= be the services price in =, respectively. Since the input bundle <̃",= is an output of
the technology in (7), the cost minimization on the choice of primary inputs yields the following
unit cost for producing a bundle, which is denoted by 2̃",=,
2̃",= = Ψ
[
F:=
]W:
"
[
FD=
]WD
"
[
%",=
]W"
"
[
%(,=
]W(
" (8)
where Ψ is a constant.7 Following studies such as Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001),
Copeland and Taylor (2004), and Shapiro and Walker (2018), we summarise the set of envi-
ronmental regulations into a Pigouvian emission tax on unit emission of pollutant by the local
manufacturing sector, denoted by Z= in = (the assumptions for Z= will be discussed below). Then,
from (6) and 0 ≥ B= ≥ 1,the profit maximization problem of a firm becomes:
max
<̃",= (G) ,I",= (G)
?",=
(
I",= (G)
_",=
) X (
q= (G)",=<̃",= (G)
)1−X − 2̃",=<̃",= (G) − Z=I",= (G) (9)
7. Namely, Ψ ≡
[
(W:
"
)W:" (WD
"
)WD" ∏ 9′=",( (W 9′" )W 9′" ]−1 .
13
The first order conditions for the problem (9) yields the optimal unit cost which is given by
2",=
q= (G)1−X1−X",=
, where
2",= =
(
2̃",=
1 − X
)1−X (
_",=Z=
X
) X
(10)
A final manufacturing good is produced by a competitive local aggregator. The final good
is a composite produced by a CES function that use all the varieties G ∈ [0, 1]. Input varieties
are sourced from the lowest cost region across all the locations = = 1, ..., # , including an iceberg
trade cost to ship the good from 8 to =, g=8 > 1. The aggregation function is
&",= =
[∫
@",= (G)
f"−1
f" 3G
] f"
f"−1
(11)
where f" is the elasticity of substitution. The price of the input variety G used for final
production in = satisfies ?",= (G) = min8∈1,...,#
{
2",8 g=8
1−X
",8
q̃8 (G)
}
. Exploiting the property of the
Fréchet distribution for q8 (G), the share of expenditure on varieties from region 8 in the total
expenditure for manufacturing varieties in = is given by,
c"=8 =
(g=82",8)−\ (",8) \∑#
8′=1(g=8′2",8′)−\ (",8′) \
(12)
and the price of the final manufacturing good available in = is then given by
%",= =
[
 "
#∑
8=1
(g=82",8)−\ (",8) \
]− 1
\
(13)
where, \ ≡ \̃1−X and  " ≡
(
Γ
(
\−f"+1
\
)) 1
1−f" is a constant.
Services Sector Goods Service sector goods are treated as non-traded, in a similar way to
Caliendo et al. (2018) and other studies. We admit that this is a strong assumption. This is
because the overall trade cost required to deliver services to a distant customer seems to be
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substantially higher than that of manufactured goods.8 Therefore, in the current model, we treat
them as non-traded and the services firms only serve local customers within the city =. A services
sector firm combines skilled labor, unskilled labor, and manufactured goods. The production
function is given by:
&(,= = (,= [!:(,=]
W:
(,= [!D(,=]
WD
(,= [<"(,=]
W"
(,= (14)
where, <"
(,=
is manufacturing inputs of the services sector.9 The technology is constant returns
to scale such that
∑
9′∈:,D," W
9′
(,=
= 1 is satisfied. Note that we assume that W 9
′
(,=
varies across
cities. Later we detail how we calibrate these with the data. (,= is the productivity shifter of
the services sector in = that is exogenous for individual services firms. Let %(,= denote the local
price of the services goods in =. Cost minimization and free entry ensures that the price should
satisfy
%(,= =
Ψ(,=
(,=
(F:=)
W:
(,= (FD=)
WD
(,= (%",=)W
"
(,= (15)
where Ψ(,= is a constant.10
Goods Market Clearing In the equilibrium, all markets clear. Let. 9 ,8 ,∀ 9 ∈ {, ", (} denote
the total value of production of sector 9 in 8. Similarly,  9 ,= denotes the value of expenditure on
sector 9 in =. Firstly, the total agricultural supply should be equal to the demand,
∑
8∈W
.,8 =
∑
=∈W
,= (16)
For manufacturing varieties, the total value of production must be equal to the sum of demand
from all the potential destinations, i.e., .",8 =
∑
=∈W ",=c=8 . Using (12) and (13), this
8. According to the main estimates by Gervais and Jensen (2019) on U.S. data, trade costs for the eleven sub-sectors
in the services category range from 3.95 times (wholesale trade) to 28.67 times (real estate and leasing).
9. The services sector of course uses agricultural goods as well as land as inputs, however, we drop these from
the production function for the sake of simplicity. According to China’s input-output tables, their contribution is very
marginal for the services sector, the coefficients for agricultural inputs and land are 0.016 and 0.039, respectively.
10. Ψ(,= = (W:(,=)
−W:
(,= (WD
(,=
)−W
D
(,= (W"
(,=
)−W
"
(,= .
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condition can be rewritten as:
.",8 = ̃",=2
−\
8
∑
=∈W
g−\=8 ",=%
\
",= (17)
where, ̃",= ≡  \",=. Since the services sector goods are non-traded, the local production
should match local demand. Mirroring this equality in the services sector, the sum of the
production values of the two traded sector should be equal to the sum of the demand for them, in
every location. Therefore, we have
.(,= = (,=, ∀= ∈ W (18)
.,= + .",= = ,= + ",=, ∀= ∈ W (19)
Industrial Emission Revenue from emission charge As a means of environmental control,
local government collects emission charges frommanufacturing firms. Let /",8 be the aggregate
amount of pollutant discharged to the environment from manufacturing firms in 8. Given the
unit emission charge Z8 in 8, the 8’s government collects Z8/",8 . The first order condition for (9)
yields:
Z8/",8 = X.",8 (20)
Local government employs skilled workers to implement pollution control. No production
technology is specified for this control, while the demand for skilledworkers of this environmental
control task just has to satisfy a simple resource constraint,
F:8 !
:
/ = Z8/",8 (21)
which means that the wage payment to the skilled employees equals to the revenue from emission
charges collected from the manufacturing firms. This assumption can also be interpreted as that
the local government rebates back the collected emission charges to skilled workers.
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Land Market Local government collects land rent revenue and redistributes it to residents.
For simplicity, we assume that the government redistributes the revenue so that it augments their
wage income by the factor of (1+`) where ` > 0. From the utility function, the total expenditure
on land in = is A== = (1 − U) (1 + `) (F:=!:= + FD=!D=). At the same time, the revenue should be
equal to the total amount redistributed, which means A== = `(F:=!:= +FD=!D=). Then, ` = 1−UU .
This yields the equilibrium land rent given as
A= =
1 − U
U
F:=!
:
= + FD=!D=
=
(22)
Expenditure on Goods As explained above, the income of a type C worker is wage income
plus rebated land rent, thus FC=/U. Production of manufacture and services requires input goods
other than labor. Given these, the expenditure for sector 9 in location = becomes:
,= = j,= (F:=!:= + FD=!D=)
",= = j",= (F:=!:= + FD=!D=) + (1 − X)W"".",= + W"(,=.(,=
(,= = j(,= (F:=!:= + FD=!D=) + (1 − X)W(".",=
(23)
Labor incomes and labor market clearing According to the assumptions about production
functions, the total wage earnings of skilled and unskilled labors are given as follows,
F:8 !
:
8 =
(
(1 − X)W:" + X
)
.",8 + W:(,=.(,8
FD8 !
D
8 = .,8 + (1 − X)WD".",8 + WD(,=.(,8
(24)
Note that these equations are the labor market clearing conditions, given that the total labor
supply of type C workers in 8 is !C
8
, C ∈ {:, D}.
Emissions fromConsumption Recent studies reveal that emissions from the consumption side,
which arise when consumers use manufacturing products, are becoming increasingly important
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(Liu et al. 2016; Li et al. 2017).11 Not only in the advanced countries, even in several developing
countries such as China, emissions from the use of transportation (for example, vehicles) as
well as emissions from housing (cooking and heating) consists a large share in the emission
inventories. Therefore, here we introduce a simple mechanism of emissions from consumption,
/',= as follows. Specifically, we assume that /',= is proportional to the real manufacturing
expenditure with the fixed coefficient _',=. Assume that the use of manufactured goods generates
pollution (car, cooking equipment, air conditioning and heating, processed fuels, etc.). As the
total consumption expenditure on manufacturing in = is given by j",= (F:=!:= + FD=!D=) along
with the price %",=, the residential emissions is given by
/',= = _',=
j",= (F:=!:= + FD=!D=)
%",=
(25)
Emission to Pollution The anthropogenic emissions of pollutants such as SO2, NOx, and
the primary emission of PM2.5, contributes to the formulation of air pollution through various
complex chemical reactions. Other than those pollutants from economic activities, sources such
as sand storms from deserts, volcanos, and sea salt, plays an important role in determining
the area’s level of pollution, with climate conditions such as wind, precipitation, humidity, and
temperature. Thus, themechanism that determines how emissions fromhuman activity affects the
local ambient quality is very complex, and a full-scale scientific weather model is needed to make
a prediction of air quality for a given level of emissions. Unfortunately, the predictive models
that are commonly used are designed for a short term prediction within a small geographical
area. In our case, we intend to connect the annual sum of emissions to the annual average level
of air quality, within a relatively large geographical unit.
11. Karagulian et al. (2015) conduct a meta-analysis of local studies across the world and find that industrial
emission constitutes 16-27 percent of the PM 2.5 pollution. The residential emission contributes 15-21 percent,
and traffic contributes 15-18 percent, respectively (Aunan, Hansen, and Wang 2018; Karagulian et al. 2015). Liu
et al. (2016) estimate that industry contributed around 50 to 60 percent of PM 2.5 while residential emission is
responsible for 30 to 40 percent of it, respectively in Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei area, throughout 2010. Transport
and power contributed relatively smaller share. These findings motivate us to include emissions from non-industrial
sources that we summarize as residential emission.
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Given this scientific limitation, a simple empirical relationship between local emission and
local air quality is used for the mapping of emissions into pollution. Let = denote the level
of air pollution (PM2.5 concentration) in = observed as concentration in the air (with the unit
of `6/2<3, for example), after the chemical process that transforms anthropogenic and natural
primary pollutants into harmful particulates. Assume that = has the following relationship with
the anthropogenic emissions in =; /= = /",= + /',=, the sum of emissions from manufacturing
production and residential emissions is then:
= = 5 ( -̃=)/ ^= (26)
where ^ is a coefficient on emission and 5 ( -̃=) is a function of other local characteristics denoted
by -̃=.
Pollution control policy (emission tax) Local government sets the Pigouvian tax rate, denoted
as Z=, as an emission charge. The literature on China’s local environmental regulations (Rooij
and Lo 2010; Wu et al. 2013; Wang 2013; Zheng et al. 2014; Jin, Andersson, and Zhang 2016)
points out that China’s local leaders compete with each other in their race for promotion among
the hierarchy of the Communist Party. For prefecture level leaders, getting high performance
evaluations from their upper-level officials (i.e. Provincial government), is thus the priority
that determines their policy implementation. In the past, local GDP was the main indicator
used for evaluation. This economy-focused incentive system has long been criticized for a lack
of consideration of sustainability. However, since the tenth Five Year Plan (FYP) period was
initiated in 2001, the central government has begun to include environmental targets, such as
emission reduction targets for air pollutants. Since the eleventh FYP (2006-2010), the Chinese
government has introduced the target responsibility system (TRS) for environmental pollution
that binds lower-level officers to accomplish the targets agreed with their upper-level leaders.
Our modelling of the local government problem reflects this Chinese context. In particular,
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we assume that the evaluation of the government =, denoted by += is defined by
+= = −b6=/",= + l= (27)
where= = F:=!:=+FD=!D= is city =’s total value added (GDP), andl ∈ (0, 1). b
6
= > 0 is the city =
specific coefficient that reflects how much upper-level governments stress environmental quality
in their evaluation of the government of =. The local government choose Z= that maximizes
+=. It is assumed that the local government ignores (or cannot know) the impact of its Z= on
population, !:= and !D=, and the price index %) ,=, and regards them as given.
Under this assumption, a similar derivation for the Samuelson condition as in Antweiler,
Copeland, and Taylor (2001) applies. The first order condition with respect to Z= in (27) yields:
Z= =
b
6
=
l
1−l= (28)
(28) tells us that the emission tax is higher where the economic scale is larger. This is quite a
simple specification, however, it reflects the observed relationship between emission intensity and
the city’s economic scale described in Section A.3; which is that, the larger the city’s economic
scale is, the smaller the emission intensity from manufacturing. Given the pollution supply
function (28), and the pollution function (20), the equilibrium industrial emission is:
/",= =
Xl
b
6
=
l=
.",=
=
(29)
Migration It has long been argued that domesticmigration, especially rural-to-urbanmigration,
is severely restricted in China under the "hukou" system. The majority of econometric research
studies on China up to the early 2000s assumed that labor is immobile due to the hukou restriction
(e.g. Au and Henderson 2006b, 2006a). However, this restriction has been gradually eased during
the past two decades and the Chinese labor force is currently very mobile, although there still
remains substantial social and institutional discrimination against migrants(Song 2014). In
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terms of volume, rural to urban migration has been very large and we cannot explain the massive
urbanization and industrialization of China in the past few decades without inter-prefectural and
inter-provincial migration. The urbanization rate (urban population share in total population)
rose from 18 percent in 1978 to 53 percent in 2011 (Chen et al. 2013). In the past 30 years,
urban population has increased by 440 million, and half of that is said to be attributable to rural
to urban migration. Given these facts, it has become more appropriate than ever before to treat
labor as geographically mobile in China. For example, using a similar approach, Baum-Snow
et al. (2015) conducted a simulation study to assess the impact of road network improvements
on population and production, assuming both perfect labor mobility and immobility.We follow
the widely used Fréchet distributed "mobility frictions" (Baum-Snow et al. 2018) that are also
assumed in the studies such as Baum-Snow et al. (2015), Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016),
Redding (2016), Balboni (2016), and Faber and Gaubert (2019). In contrast to these studies,
however, we assume that both skilled and unskilled workers migrate across prefectures in China
searching for the place that offer them the highest utility. For each type, the expected utility
should be equalized across space in the equilibrium. Noting that the real income of type C worker
living in = can be written as
(
1
%) ,=
)U (
=
=
)1−U
FC=, and that the idiosyncratic location preference
n is Fréchet distributed, the spatial distribution of type C workers is then given by,
!C=
!CC
=
(
̃C= exp(−bC=)
 1−U= F
C
=
%U
) ,=
1−U=
) [C
∑
=′∈C
(
̃C
=′ exp(−bC=′)
 1−U
=′ F
C
=′
%U
) ,=′
1−U
=′
) [C , ∀= ∈ C (30)
For outside of China, the RoW, population is fixed.
Equilibrium The equilibrium of this economy can be defined as follows: Given the pa-
rameters, {\, X, U, g1, [: , [D , b: , bD , d, l, ^, W:9 , WD9 , W"9 , W(9 }, inter-city trade cost matrix {g},
and exogenous variables {",8 , (,8, :8 , D8 , Z
6
8
}, the equilibrium is the vectors of quantities
{/",8 , /',8, 8 , !:8 , !D8 }, prices {F:8 , FD8 , A8 , Z8 , %",8 , %(,8}, values {.,8 , .",8, .(,8, ,8 , "8 , (,8},
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and the manufacturing trade share matrix {c=8}, that are given as the solutions to (26), (20),
(25), (30), (24), (22), (28), (13), (15), (18), (19), (23), and (12).
3 Quantification of the Model
Since the model cannot be solved analytically, we calibrate it to the observed situation of China in
2010 to conduct numerical exercises. The data for the observed variables include the population
of skilled and unskilled workers, the value added of three industrial sectors (primary, secondary,
and tertiary), the PM2.5 concentration, the emission of pollutants, and other variables that are
used in the estimation procedure for some of the model parameters. The details of the data and
the calibration strategy are explained in Section A.2 and Section A.4.
We combine multiple data sources to conduct the analysis. We focus on the 296 geographical
units (270 prefecture-level cities and 26 counties directly under the Provinces) in the Eastern
half of the mainland China. Four provinces and autonomous regions, namely, Inner Mongolia,
Xinjiang, Qinghai, Tibet, and islands (such as Hainan Province) are not included in these 296
units and treated as the RoW. Economic variables, such as the value added and employment of
industries, are taken from the China City Statistical Yearbook, China Region Economy Statistical
Yearbook, as well as the online supplementary material of Baum-Snow et al. (2017). Our analysis
needs the amount of skilled and unskilled worker in each city. The best available proxy for the
people’s skill level is educational attainment of the residents. Since the data on educational
attainment of workers are not available (only adult population by degrees is available), we
assume that the share of the skilled worker in all the worker in a city is equal to the share of adult
population with at least senior high school degree out of the total adult population in the city.
Environmental variables such as PM2.5 concentration and emissions of air pollutants are from
the sources using satellite images provided by Donkelaar et al. (2016) and the MEIC database.12
The model requires the estimate of the iceberg trade cost for manufacturing intermediates
12. http://www.meicmodel.org/index.html
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between each pair of cities and between the RoW, g=8 . Since the model yields a gravity equation
of trade flow between each pair of cities, we can recover g=8 as Caliendo et al. (2018) if we have
a bilateral trade flow statistics. However, there is no available data on the bilateral flow of trade
among the pairs of prefecture-level cities in China. Therefore, we have to construct it based
on the distance and the quality of transport infrastructure. Specifically, we closely follow the
data and the method by Baum-Snow et al. (2018) that uses the digitized map of China’s road
network as of 2010 which is provided in their on-line appendix and calculate the shortest paths
(shortest travel time) between each pair of cities by the Dijkstra algorithm (the average travel
speed according to the grade of motorways is reflected). Then, we convert the calculated travel
times in hours between each pair of cities into a matrix of iceberg trade cost.13
There is no information available for the wage rates of skilled workers and unskilled workers
at the level of prefecture cities. We impute the skill-based local wages exploiting the model’s
equilibrium conditions and the sector-specific wage rates from the national level provided in the
China Statistical Yearbook. Through the process of recovering the local wages for the skilled
and unskilled workers, we also derive sector-specific input parameters for skilled and unskilled,
W:
9
and WD
9
, so that the model based national average wage rates become equal to the observed
ones.
We estimate the remaining parameters; goods expenditure share U, international border effect
g1, labor supply elasticity [C and taste for air pollution bC for each of C ∈ :, D, the elasticity of
substitution among three category of goods d, the emission tax elasticity to GDP, l, and the
elasticity of city PM2.5 with respect to city’s pollutant emissions ^. Among them, the most
important parameters are [C and bC , which are found to substantially affect the simulation results.
To estimate these parameters, we exploit the equilibrium conditions that pin down the labor
incomes (24) and migration (30). From (24) and (30), the population of type C labor in = can be
13. Specifically, the trade cost between city 8 and 9 , g8 9 , is given by g8 9 = 1 + 0.004(hours of travel time8 9 )0.8. See
Baum-Snow et al. (2018) for the detail.
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expressed as:
ln !C= = V0 − bC
[C
[C + 1= +
[C
[C + 1 ln ,̃
C
= + ñ C =, ∀= ∈ C (31)
where: ,̃ := ≡
( (1−X)W:"+X).",=+W:(,=.(,=
%U
) ,=
1−U=
, ,̃D= ≡
.,=+(1−X)WD".",=+W
D
(,=
.(,=
%U
) ,=
1−U=
, and = is the level of
pollution derived by using the annual average concentration of PM2.5 as a proxy, respectively.
The equation (31) gives the relationship between the population of type C worker in = and the air
pollution and the real wage in =. We estimate (31) to obtain the values for bC and [C .
This method, of course, could be prone to endogeneity issues. Specifically, the OLS estimate
of bC can be overestimated (in terms of magnitude) if an unobserved productivity of the services
sector raises both the services sector share in the city as well as the labor supply to the city.
Similarly, the OLS estimates of [C tend to be underestimated by the existence of unobserved
amenities that attract workers. On the other hand, unobserved productivity shocks may cause an
overestimation of [C . We borrow from existing studies to address these identification concerns.
For air pollution terms that are critical in estimating bC , we follow Freeman et al. (2017) and
instrument air pollution (measured by PM2.5 concentration) by the SO2 emission from thermal
power plants within the up wind direction from the city (excluding that from their own city).
The identification assumption is that the thermal plant emission from upwind locations affect
the city’s worker population only through its impact on air pollution conditional on the control
variables. For the estimation of [C , we benefit from Baum-Snow et al. (2018) who estimated the
impact of road infrastructure in 2010 on the employment and economic outcomes of Chinese
cities. They instrument 2010 infrastructure variables with 1962 infrastructure variables. For
identification, we assume that the 1962 infrastructure affects the population of 2010 skilled
(unskilled) workers only through the real wage paid to them conditional on the controls.
Through these estimations, we try to verify that the model’s equilibrium condition holds
in the real world in a meaningful way. Our estimates of labor supply elasticities, [C , welfare
effects of air pollution, bC , and the Pigouvian tax parameter, l, are within reasonable ranges
compared to the existing studies, and are consistent with the model’s assumptions. The details
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Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Source
\ 5 Baum-Snow et al. (2018)
X 0.011 Shapiro and Walker (2018)
U 0.87 Estimated (expenditure share on housing, based on China Statis-
tical Yearbook 2011)
g1 1.68 Estimated (applying equation (53) in the Appendix to China’s
export and import)
[: 3.52 Estimated (equation (31) )
[D 1.16 Estimated (equation (31) )
b: 0.013 Estimated (equation (31) )
bD 0.0095 Estimated (equation (31) )
d 3.45 Estimated (Search the value that minimize observed and model
expenditure share over three goods category, at the Provincial
level))
l 0.466 Estimated (equation (58) in the Appendix)
^ 0.16 Estimated (OLS regressing PM2.5 on industry and consumption
emissions)
Source: Author
of the calibration and estimation is explained in Section A.4. Of course, it should be noted that
our verification through estimation addresses a subset of equilibrium conditions. It is desirable
therefore to have a more comprehensive check on whether the model well replicates the observed
endogenous variables, as Tombe and Zhu (2019) do by exploiting intertemporal changes in the
exogenous variables. Unfortunately, however, the full set of data required for that analysis is
available only for 2010, preventing such an exercise that requires a city-level panel dataset.
Minding these limitations, we examine how the qualitative results of the simulation change by
the choice of these parameters in Section 5.
We calibrate the following the remaining parameters borrowing the knowledge from existing
literature: the Fréchet dispersion parameter for manufacturing productivity, \, and the input share
of pollutant emission (equivalent to the inverse of abatement efficiency), X. Table 1 summarizes
the calibrated and estimated parameters used in the simulation exercises.
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4 Simulation Exercises to Study the Model’s Properties
The main purpose of this paper is to understand the impact of pollution control policy on
environmental, economic, and welfare outcomes. In what follows, we study several theoretical
implications of the model using the calibrated model. We specifically focus on the exogenous
change to pollution control policy which is captured by b̂6= . This parameter represents how much
the evaluation of local government = is damaged by an increase in industrial emissions from its
jurisdiction. We first examine how a regulatory shock to a particular city =, captured by b̂6= ,
will have spatial impacts on economic and environmental variables. An increase in b6= for city
= affects the outcomes of itself. In addition, it also have varied impacts on other cities. The
signs and the magnitudes of the own effect and the spillover effects are not readily obvious, as
the model accommodates various channels of impact that mutually interfere with each other.
Given this analysis, we further seek for desirable spatial allocation of responsibility to reduce
emissions. Setting an aggregate emission reduction target to 10 percent, we compare various
weighting strategies that differentiate localized reduction responsibility across cities, in addition
to a uniform allocation that assigns the same magnitude (in percent) of reduction responsibility
to all cities. We find that some strategies are superior to the uniform strategy. Interestingly, even
though the stronger pollution control is costly for individual firms and we rule out technological
mechanisms that cause that stricter regulation raises productivity, we find that a few strategies
may result in an increase in national real GDP. We discuss in detail how these strategies are
different in terms of environmental, economic and welfare outcomes.
Throughout the analysis, we examine how the key assumptions of the model affect the derived
elasticities with respect to the shocks in the exogenous variables. Specifically, we compare our
baseline model with counterfactual models that shut-out three important ingredients; the migra-
tion of workers, international trade, and preference for air quality. The counterfactual models
give significantly different outcomes from those of the baseline, meaning that the relevance of
these key assumptions as well as the potential sensitivity to the estimated parameter values.
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As shown in the Appendix A.1, the model allows us to employ the “method of change”
proposed by Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2008) to solve for the counterfactual equilibriumwithout
knowing the levels of unobserved variables.
4.1 Impact of Unilateral Policy Change in a City
We first illustrate the spatial propagation of impact from a unilateral policy change in a single
city. As an example, we choose Beijing, Wuhan, and Deyang, and examine how the impact differs
depending on the place the policy shock originates from. Let 8′ ∈ {Beijing, Wuhan, Deyang}
denote the city that receives unilateral policy change. We compute the elasticity of outcome
variables in all the 296 cities with respect to /̂6, which is a vector whose 8′-th element is b̂6
8′ = 1.1
while keeping other elements to b̂6
8
= 1 for 8 ≠ 8′. This means that the city 8′ increases
its regulatory parameter by 10 percent, while other cities keep it unchanged. The choice of
magnitude at 10 percent is reasonable considering the policy context of China around 2010.
China has set national level environmental targets for every Five-Year Plan (FYP), since its 11th
FYP for the years 2006-2010. Under this FYP, a nationwide reduction target of the emission of
industrial SO2 was set to 10 percent of the level in 2005. In the 12th FYP, the SO2 reduction
target was set to 8 percent of the 2010 emission level, while the target of 10 percent reduction for
NOG was added(Aunan, Hansen, and Wang 2018).14 As (29) implies, if  and ." are constant,
the elasticity of /",= with respect to b6= is -1. Therefore, a naive policy response to the national
target to reduce emission by 10 percent is to raise b6 by 10 percent. We thus pick this level
for our reference magnitude in conducting simulation studies. We also experiment with other
magnitudes and find that the relationship with the size of magnitude and the elasticities is linear
in general.15
There are several interesting results that contrast the model to conventional predictions. First,
14. The national reduction target was disaggregated into Provincial level targets, which vary from 0 percent to 30
percent.
15. More precisely, the elasticity is weakly concave, with slightly larger elasticity when the policy magnitude is
smaller.
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as indicated in panel (a) of Figure 1, the elasticity of industrial emission is greater than -1. This
means that if the b6
48 98=6
rises by 10 percent, Beijing’s industrial emission is only reduced by
9.59 percent. As equation (29) implies, it is not theoretically obvious whether the elasticity of
industrial emission is larger or smaller than −1, because it depends on how aggregate production
= and manufacturing share .",=/= changes in response to b6= . Note that the nominal GDP
() of Beijing responds positively to the stricter environmental regulation as shown in panel (i).
In this case, a positive scale effect offsets the direct effect of increased b6, and that results in an
elasticity of industrial emission greater than −1. The positive scale effect of the regulation in
this case coincides with the increased employment (thus in-migration) of skilled and unskilled
workers to Beijing as shown in panels (d) and (e). This is an effect that cannot be predicted by
the models without mobility of production factors (Copeland and Taylor 2004).
Regarding the propagated effect to cities outside of Beijing, panel (a) of Figure 1 shows an
interesting contrast to the standard theoretical prediction of the PHE. If a pollution haven emerges,
strengthening the environmental regulations in Beijing will cause an increase of emissions
somewhere outside of Beijing, through the relocation of polluting industry to areas with relatively
less stringent environmental policies. However, as shown in panel (a), the elasticity is everywhere
negative, which means that the PHE does not take place here. The reduced emission from Beijing
is not offset by increased emissions in other places. The environmental impact is even amplified
by the reduced emission outside of the city, induced by Beijing’s local policy. The reason
for this can be seen in panels (d) and (e), that depicts the elasticities of the labor supply of
skilled and unskilled workers, respectively. Beijing attracts both types of labor through the
strengthened regulations, with a higher magnitude for skilled labor (0.099 for skilled compared
to 0.073 for unskilled). Policy changes in Beijing therefore slightly attract labor from almost
all over China, and contract the scale of production scale in places other than Beijing, as panel
(i) suggests. Furthermore, as seen in panel (j), the composition effect which is the share of
manufacturing production in total production decreases everywhere including outside of Beijing.
These structural changes in scale and composition ensure the reduction of emissions everywhere
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in China, in response to policy changes in Beijing.
To understand the reasons why these spillover effects in labor supply and production structure
emerge, we need further elaboration. First, a comparison of panel (g) and (h) reveals that skilled
worker real wage respond in a opposite way as unskilled worker real wage. For the skilled
workers, the real wage decreases in Beijing and increases almost everywhere outside of that
city. Conversely, the unskilled worker’s real wage increases in Beijing but decreases in other
cities. The SEE (spatial equilibrium effect) works here. Skilled workers put more weight on air
quality than unskilled workers as our estimated coefficients satisfy b: > bD , consistent with the
assumption in (1). Due to this, the improvement in air quality in Beijing is large enough for skilled
workers to compensate for the decline in real wages there. As in panel (l), the influx of skilled
workers is associated with the decline in service price in Beijing which contributes to raise the
real wage of the unskilled worker (note that the nominal unskilled wage is fixed by assumption).
Then, both skilled and unskilled labor partially relocate to Beijing, and drive down production
outside Beijing. Furthermore, the increase in b6 in Beijing raises the unit production cost of
manufacturing there as in (10), which has spatial spillover effect on the manufacturing price index
as in panel (k). This affects manufacturing production costs everywhere in China because the
sector uses manufacturing intermediates as its inputs, making the response of the composition
effect negative everywhere in China as in (j). These complex but rich relationships among the
variables all work together to influence how our environmental variables are determined.
For price indices, note that the magnitude of the manufacturing price change is slightly
smaller in the regions surrounding Guangdong Province and Shanghai, that are close to the
international port. Due to better access to international markets, these areas trade less (in terms
of share) with Beijing in the initial equilibrium. Therefore, the impact of unit cost increase in
Beijing due to stricter regulation is mitigated. Panel (l) shows the elasticity of services prices,
%( . Only ‘own’ elasticity is negative while the others are positive. This is consistent with
the responses of labors in panels (e) and (f). The services sector in Beijing benefits from the
increased labor supply that drives down wages, while other cities will be affected by the reduced
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labor supply, as well as increases in the manufacturing price index as this is an input in the sector.
In summary, the economic implication of a unilateral policy change in our model is thus
substantially different from the traditional PHE world. Stricter regulations in Beijing do not raise
industrial emissions in other cities. Furthermore, higher b6
48 98=6
is not an economic burden for
Beijing, while causing a slight damage to outside cities.
4.2 Where the Shock Originates Matters
By comparing the results of the same exercise for other epicenters of the shocks, namely Wuhan
and Deyang, we examine whether these spatial patterns of the impact are universal. Figure A.4
shows the results for the city of Wuhan, the capital city of Hubei Province located in the central
part of China. Figure A.5 shows the same for Deyang, a city in Sichuan Province. The spatial
patterns of the propagation are fairly contrasting. As the panel (a) of Figure A.4 depicts, a
policy shock in Wuhan reduces the industrial emission of neighboring cities. However, as the
distance from the origin grows, the magnitude of elasticity shrinks more rapidly than the case
of Beijing, reaching close to zero in the middle distance from Wuhan. Then, the elasticity again
declines (magnitude increases) slightly when going much further. In contrast to Beijing, the
emission elasticity is no longer monotonic with respect to the distance from Wuhan, showing an
inverted V-shaped curve. The example of the shock from Deyang, in Figure A.5, shows a more
exaggerated picture. In panel (a), the policy shock in Deyang is sown to cause a PHE in cities
relatively closer to Deyang and the color turns red, except for a few direct neighbors.
4.3 Sensitivity to the Model’s Key Assumptions
The model is different from the standard approach used to study the impact of local pollution
control policy on national or global economies in three aspects. First, it allows for the production
factor (workers) migration between cities. Second, workers care not only for their economic
welfare but also environmental quality. Finally,it explicitly adds international trade to a domestic
trade model. We ask what are the roles of these assumptions in determining the observed spatial
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Figure 1: Illustration of the Spatial Effect of Policy Shocks from Beijing
(a) Industrial Emission (b) total Emission (c) PM2.5
(d) Skilled labor (e) Unskilled labor (f) Exposure
(g) Skilled Real Wage (h) Unskilled Real Wage (i) Scale Effect (Nominal GDP)
(j) Composition Effect (k) Manufacturing Price (%" ) (l) Services Price (%()
Source: Author
Note: The maps depict elasticities computed against 10% change in the regulation parameter of Beijing (b6
48 98=6
).
Red colour indicates the positive computed elasticities, while the blue indicates the negative ones. The midpoint of
the color palette is set to zero.
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Table 2: Counterfactual Models
Feature NMTW NTW NW Benchmark
Domestic Migration x o o o
International Trade x x o o
Preference for Air Quality x x x o
Source: Author
Note: This table compares the features of the four models. "o" indicates that the
model considers the feature as one of model’s key mechanisms. If "x", the model
treats the feature as restricted to zero.
effects.
To examine how sensitive the results on these assumptions, we compare three counterfactual
models as explained below. Table 2 summarizes the features of the models we compare. Firstly,
NMTW is a no-migration, no-trade, and no-welfare effect model. This counterfactual assumes
that workers do not move from their current city, that trade takes place only within China, and
that air pollution does not harm worker’s welfare. Note that this is equivalent to a domestic
trade version of the model of Eaton and Kortum (2002) with pollution as a regulated production
input. The NTW (no-trade and no-welfare effect) model relaxes NMTW by allowing domestic
migration. But, international trade is still ruled out, meaning that the geographical scope of
migration and trade is only within the domestic arena. The third counterfactual, NW, introduces
international trade. Through this change, goods gain a wider scope of mobility than workers
because they become mobile across international borders.
Figure 2 shows the features of the four models using the results of simulation for a unilateral
10 percent increase in Beijing, by setting ̂b6
48 98=6
= 1.1 while keeping it to 1 for the others.
Panel (a) compares the elasticity of Beijing’s industrial emissions to its own policy change.
All elasticities are negative and close to -1. Panel (b) plots the relationship between the city’s
distance to Beijing and its elasticity for each of four models. The red is for the NMTW model.
Elasticity is negative for the cities near to Beijing then turns positive as the distance grows.
This normal domestic trade model shows that the pollution haven effect (PHE) occurs in space.
The negative elasticity nearby cities corresponds to the effects on the manufacturing price index
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captured in the panel (c). Due to the linkage through costly trade, the price index (i.e. input
price) of the nearby cities increases more than that in the distant cities, pushing the polluting
production to relatively further locations. If domestic migration is allowed, the graph for the
NTW model in blue shows that the curve becomes steeper than the case of the NMTW. The
decline in real income near Beijing due to increases in the price index and the reallocation of
manufacturing make the worker migrate to cities further from Beijing. Migration flow outward
from the Beijing area makes the response of emissions more elastic than in the case of MNTW.
Then, introducing international trade shifts theMTW curve down, as the graph for the NWmodel
(in green) shows. By introducing international trade, firms in China face price competition with
foreign firms. Stricter regulation in Beijing increases input costs in China through the increases
in the price index, %" , with a larger magnitude than in the foreign market. This decreases
China’s competitiveness in manufacturing and reduces the production scale of manufacturing in
the cities in China. As a result, the elasticity of emission for the NW model is lower than for the
NTW model, and the area with negative elasticity expands. Finally, adding the preference for
air quality to the NW model delivers our benchmark model. As we can observe from panel (b),
introducing this preference substantially reduces the slope of the emission elasticity with respect
to the distance from Beijing. In the benchmark model, both skilled and unskilled workers care
about air quality when choosing a residential location. Since Beijing and nearby areas reduce
emission and pollution, both skilled and unskilled labor migrate toward Beijing. This shrinks
the scale of production outside the Beijing area, and offsets the PHE by the increase in the price
index.
In contrast to the NTWmodel where tougher environmental regulation works as a centrifugal
force on skilled labor, in the benchmark model it is a centripetal force. On the other hand, note
that tougher regulation is always a centripetal force for unskilled labor. This happens due to
the two substitutions that unskilled labor has between skilled labor and emissions. A tougher
regulation of emission raises the price for emission, thus the factor demand for production shifts
to demand more labor. However, due to the higher labor supply elasticity of skilled labor
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([: > [D), skilled labor moves more sensitively in response to changes in the real wage, under
the NW setting where they do not care about air quality. Unskilled labor is therefore a substitute
for both emissions and skilled labor in the production of manufactured good and services.
In summary, the assumptions on migration and international trade play important roles
in determining the behavior of the model. Allowing for migration or not in the model, or
incorporating the welfare effect of pollution for workers, will significantly affect the degree of
“distance decay” of the elasticity of emissions with respect to a cities’ distance from the epicenter
city. Disregarding the migration or welfare effect of air pollution might lead overstatement of
the local impact of stringent pollution control policies. The migration of workers may work to
mitigate such local impacts, especially if they care about pollution as studied by Chen, Oliva,
and Zhang (2017) and Freeman et al. (2017). Ignoring international trade may also lead to an
exaggeration of the local effects of regulation and the potential of the pollution haven effect by
missing the channel of foreign demand.
4.4 Comparing Aggregate Impacts of Local Policy
The spatial impact of local environmental policy differs with the location of any change that
occurs. This suggests that the impact of local policy on aggregate outcomes may also vary
depending on where the policy change happens. To show this, Figure 4 depicts the elasticities
of the aggregate variables with respect to a local 10 percent increase in pollution control policy.
The color and darkness of each map represent the sign and the magnitude of the elasticity of
the national aggregate of the outcome variables with respect to this increase in the regulatory
parameter b6= in each city.16
The elasticity of the aggregate emissions is depicted in panel (a). The elasticity is in fact
highly correlated with the size of emissions from each city, with a correlation coefficient of
-0.999. This is consistent with the previous observation we examined in the case of local policy
in Beijing (and other two cities), where the elasticity of local emissions to policy in its own city
16. Average exposure to air pollution is average PM2.5 concentration weighted by share of population.
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Figure 2: Model Comparison
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Note: Panel (b) and (c) depict the relationship between the distance from the city that the policy shock (environmental
regulation) originates in (i.e. Beijing) and the elasticity of industrial emissions (b) or the price index (c) to the shock,
comparing the benchmark model and three counterfactual settings, NMTW, NTW, and NW.
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Figure 3: Counterfactual Models (Elasticities of Emission and Real GDPw.r.t. Regulation Shock
in Beijing)
(a) NMTW:Emission (b) NMTW: Real GDP
(c) NTW: Emission (d) NTW: Real GDP
(e) NW: Emission (f) NW: Real GDP
(g) Benchmark: Emission (h) Benchmark: Real GDP
Source: Author
Note: The maps compares the four different models assuming the same policy shock (10 percent increase in b6= of the
city =) happens in Beijing.
36
is close to -1, while the magnitude of the elasticity of the cities outside of the epicenter city
is far smaller than one, as shown in panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2. Figure 4 panel (b) shows
the elasticity of the nationwide average exposure to air pollution, calculated as the change of
population weighted average of PM2.5 concentration from the baseline. As shown in panel (a) and
(b), emission and exposure elasticities are everywhere negative. There is no case where stricter
policy in a city causes an aggregate increase in emissions or exposure to pollution. Despite the
fact that there are cities such asWuhan and Deyang where stricter regulation causes an increase of
emissions in other cities, this PHE is not large enough to exceed the direct effect on the reduction
of pollution in the epicenter and nearby cities.
The impact on aggregate economic variables is less straightforward. Panel (c) of Figure 4
illustrates how aggregate nominal GDP changes in response to strengthened pollution control
policy in a city. Interestingly, there are 40 cities out of 296 whose increases in regulatory strength
lead to a positive change in aggregate GDP. These cities tend to concentrate on the eastern coast
where the most densely populated cities in China locate, such as Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai,
and Guangzhou locate. As confirmed in panel (i) of Figure 1, a unilateral change of regulatory
strength in a city will increase the nominal GDP of its own and nearby cities while slightly
reducing that of others. For those 40 cities with positive elasticities of aggregate nominal GDP,
the positive effects on GDP of its own and nearby cities surpasses the negative effects for the
others. Panel (d) depicts the impact on aggregate real GDP. This elasticity is highly correlated
with that for the nominal GDP. For this case, there are 36 cities whose real GDP elasticity is
positive. If environmental regulation is strengthened in one of these 36 cities, it will contribute
to overall economic growth.
The economic impact of policy tends to favor unskilled workers more than the skilled. This
is shown from the decomposition of the elasticity of real GDP into the effects on skilled and
unskilled real incomes as in panel (e) and (f). Panel (e) and (f) reveal that skilled and unskilled
workers face different consequences in terms of national average real income. For the skilled
workers, national average real wage declines in most cases, except for 13 cities which are mainly
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located in the western and northern peripheries. On the contrary, the average real income of the
unskilled increases if policy change takes place in the majority of coastal cities. There are a total
of 108 cities that show the positive elasticity of average unskilled real wages.
Panels (g), (h), and (i) show the welfare elasticities with respect to the tightening of policy in
each of 296 cities. The average welfare shown in panel (g) is calculated as the weighted average
of skilled and unskilled welfare shown in (h) and (i).
5 Quantifying the Impact of National Level Policies
In the previous section, we examined the model’s comparative statics of a unilateral policy
change in a single city. The model also allows us to study the impact of pollution control policies
under more realistic situations. Since the 11th Five-Year Plan (FYP), the government of China
has set national level reduction targets of major pollutants. For example, in the 11th FYP that
covers years from 2006 to 2010, a 10 percent reduction in aggregate SO2 emissions to the level
of 2005 was set as the target. To achieve this nationwide target, a complex political process is
followed to assign the decomposed targets to provincial and prefecture level administrations as
their responsibilities for reduction. These regional targets are not uniform. Richer and populated
areas have been assigned stricter targets, and the provincial targets vary from 0 percent to 30
percent during the 11th FYP (Stoerk 2017).
In what follows, we examine the impact of control policies at the national scale and the
implications of different strategies on how to allocate reduction responsibilities across space.
More specifically, we focus on the case where China tries to reduce aggregate (the national sum
of) industrial emissions by 10 percent, reflecting the policy context in the 11th and 12th FYP, as
discussed in the previous subsection. To reduce aggregate emission by 10 percent, how should
the central government allocate reduction responsibilities across regions?
To answer this question, we compare the following six hypothetical responsibility allocations
that achieve 10 percent reduction in aggregate emissions. In the model, our policy variable is b6= .
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Figure 4: Comparing Aggregate Impacts across Epicentres (Benchmark Model)
(a) Industrial Emission
(b) Average Exposure to Pollu-
tion (c) Nominal GDP (Scale Effect)
(d) Real GDP (e) Agg. Skilled Real Income (f) Agg. Unskilled Real Income
(g) Average Welfare (h) Skilled Welfare (i) Unskilled Welfare
Source: Author
Note: The maps depicts the elasticity of the national aggregate of the variable of interest with respect to 10 percent
increase in b6= of the city =.
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Table 3: Targeting Strategies
Name Weighting variable (G) Constant (`G , mean and CI )**
(1) all Equally weighted (G= = 1,∀= ∈ C)
0.1039
[0.1038, 0.1040]
(2) zm Industrial emission
0.0277
[0.0275, 0.0278]
(3) popden Population density
0.1089
[0.1075, 0.1102]
(4) Rin_u Elasticity of average unskilled real income*
0.0802
[0.0759, 0.0844]
(5) WELF Elasticity of average welfare*
0.0498
[0.0495, 0.0500]
(6) TP Inverse of time to nearest international port
0.1099
[0.1078, 0.1121]
Source: Author
Note: * Weight is zero for cities with negative elasticity.
** "Constant" (`G) for the equation (32) in the third column is calculated as a result of simulation. The square bracket
in the third column shows the confidence interval of the estimated `G
As in equation (28), this parameter is an exogenous factor determining the Pigouvian emission
tax Z= charged to industrial firms in city =. In the following policy experiments, we compare
different ways to set the reformed policy b6
′
= ,∀= so that the new equilibrium generates 10 percent
less aggregate emission compared to the original equilibrium. There could be infinitely many
options in how to set b6
′
= to achieve an aggregate 10 percent reduction in emission. To simplify
the discussion, we model the six policy allocation strategies as follows.
Let G= denote the weight assigned to city = with
∑
=∈CG= = 1. Then, the reformed pollution
control policy for the city =, b6
′
= , satisfies:
b
6′
= (G)
b
6
=
= 1 + `GG= (32)
where `G is a constant. Equation (32) implies that city =’s new regulatory parameter (b6
′
= ) is
100×`GG= percent higher than its original, b6= . We then call the distribution of G= across = ∈ C the
allocation "strategy" of the policy change to achieve the targeted national reduction in emissions.
Table 3 summarizes the hypothetical strategies for our experiment; these are explained below.
The simplest reference strategy is to assign the same magnitude of policy change to all the cities,
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which is called the "all" strategy. In this case, G= = 1/#,∀=. Regarding the constant, `G , we
search for the value that achieves a 10 percent decline in aggregate emissions by iterating the
equilibrium calculation until the aggregate emission reduction converges to the target. For this
"all" strategy, the average of `0;; equals 0.1039, which means that all cities increase b6 by 10.39
percent to achieve 10 percent reduction in aggregate emissions.
One possible way to differentiate the allocation of reduction responsibility across cities is to
assign higher weights to those cities where the problem is more serious. The second and third
strategies are examples of this. The second strategy "zm" adjusts the weight, G=, equal to city =’s
industrial emissions in the observed equilibrium, as of 2010 in our exercise. This ensures that
large emitters face more stringent tightening of the regulations. While this strategy intuitively
seems to be an efficient way to reduce aggregate emission, it is not obvious whether it is superior
to other strategies in terms of welfare and economic outcomes. The third strategy, "popden",
is another example of a strategy to assign targets according to a current observable conditions.
In this case, we consider that the central government tries to prioritize cities with large affected
populations. Then, it sets G= equal to =’s population density.
Instead of referring to the observed city characteristics, suppose that the central government
knows the elasticity of aggregate outcomes with respect to local unilateral policy change in each
city, as summarized in Figure 4. The fourth and fifth strategies utilize these known elasticities
for unilateral policy intervention to cities. Suppose that the central government wants to achieve
reduction targets without reducing the economic benefits of low income people. The "Rin_u"
strategy intuitively aligns to this desire of the central government. This strategy assigns the
weight according to the elasticity of average real incomes of unskilled workers that is depicted
in the panel (f) of Figure 4. There are many cities whose tightening of regulations negatively
affects the average real income (those in blue in the map). We set the weight for these cities at
zero. In the "WELF" strategy, we assign a weight equal to the elasticity of the average welfare as
shown in panel (g) of Figure 4, because higher welfare gains are expected from the policy. We
also add a strategy, "TP", that assigns the weight (G=) according to the inverse of the travel time
41
to the nearest international port from the city.
As revealed in the analyses on the unilateral policy change in a single city in the previous
section, workers’ preferences for air quality play an important role in determining the spatial
impact of policy. Although we use estimated values for these parameters that are quite similar
to an existing study by Chen, Oliva, and Zhang (2017), the sensitivity of the simulation results
to different parameter values should be checked. We thus conduct a parametric bootstrap using
the estimation results for bC , similar to Faber and Gaubert (2019). Specifically, we sample the
alternative parameter values from a normal distribution with a mean equal to the point estimate
and a standard deviation equal to the standard error of the estimate (adjusted by the delta method).
This bootstrap procedure is executed 100 times. For each trial, we calculate the changes in the
equilibrium outcomes for six different strategies and stack the results to obtain the mean effect
and its confidence interval.
Simulation Results The simulation results for the six targeting strategies summarized in Table
3 are shown in Figure 5. Panel (a) compares the impact on skilled worker welfare across the six
strategies. Black graphs show the average and the 5 percent to 95 percent confidence interval as
a percentage point change, simulated using the benchmark model. For all strategies, the impact
on the skilled welfare is positive on average. The lower bound of the confidence interval at 5
percent is negative for all six strategies, suggesting that the welfare effect of the pollution control
policy to reduce national emissions by 10 percent on the skilled labor is volatile with respect to
the choice of parameter b: that captures the preference of skilled workers for better air quality.
Among the six strategies we examine, "Rin_u" strategy has a relatively higher average impact,
but its variation is much larger compared to the other five strategies. We assume that the "Rin_u"
strategy increases regulation a lot in a limited number of cities while keeping other cities from
changing their level of environmental control. The result of the "Rin_u" strategy shown in panel
(a) suggests that concentrating control intervention in a limited number of locations may deliver
higher welfare gains on average, but that this outcome can be more sensitive to the unknown
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preference parameters.
Panel (b) depicts the impact on the unskilled worker’s welfare. The average impact is positive
for all strategies. What is more, for each of the six strategies, the entire confidence interval stays
on the positive side. Thus, pollution control policy is in general beneficial for the unskilled, and
its sign is less sensitive to the preference parameter than for the case of the skilled worker.
Panels (c) and (b) show more clear contrasts of outcomes between the skilled and unskilled.
While the average real income of the skilled workers always declines under stricter pollution
control policy, unskilled workers are always better off from such changes. For both skilled and
unskilled workers, the magnitude of impact is the largest for the "Rin_u" strategy, while they are
the most sensitive to the parameter values. As shown in panel (e), strengthening pollution control
slightly reduces real GDP, but the magnitude is small and sometimes not substantially different
from zero. The "Rin_u" strategy shows the outstanding sensitivity of this effect with respect to
the choice of parameter values compared with other strategies, with a slightly positive average
effect. Exposure to pollution will surely decline with the policy intervention, as shown in panel
(f). Concentrating intervention to limited locations as in the "Rin_u" strategy will achieve the
largest decline in exposure to pollution.
For all the panels, the red cross mark shows the average impact in the case where international
trade is shut down. By comparing the cases with and without international trade, we can see that
international trade pushes the impacts that favor the unskilled workers. Without international
trade, the benefits for skilled workers shift up while those for unskilled workers shift down.
This is especially so for the average real income of unskilled workers, as this is negative when
international trade is absent while it is positive with trade.
6 Conclusion
This paper develops a spatial equilibrium framework with endogenous air pollution to quanti-
tatively study the impact of pollution control policies on welfare, economic, and environmental
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Figure 5: Comparing Strategies across the Models
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(b) Unskilled Workers’ Welfare
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(c) Skilled Worker’s Real Income
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(d) Unskilled Worker’s Real Income
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(e) Real GDP
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(f) Average Air Pollution Exposure
Source: Author
Note: These graphs depict the bootstrap mean and 5 percent confidence interval of the impact of nationwide policy to reduce 
aggregate emissions by 10 percent, as a percentage change of concerned outcome variables, across the six different targeting 
strategies. The black circle shows the mean of the effect and the lines stretching out from the circle shows the confidence 
interval. The red cross mark showse mean of the impact when assuming China is a closed country.
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outcomes at regional and national scales. We calibrate the model to the Chinese economy’s
situation in 2010 at the level of prefecture-level cities. Some of the important parameters are
estimated by exploiting the model’s equilibrium conditions. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first attempt to explicitly incorporate endogenous air pollution into a quantitative spatial
equilibrium framework. In our model, pollution control regulation is costly for firms as it may
cause a reallocation of polluting industries to regions with more lax regulations, while this PHE
can be (partially) offset by migration of workers who value air quality as a residential amenity.
We conduct a series of hypothetical simulations to study the implications of our theoretical
model in a realistic setting. This approach allows the study of how a unilateral change of
environmental policy in a single city can affect the city itself and other cities in China. In
contrast to conventional trade-environment models, our spatial equilibrium framework with
worker migration exhibits some cases where local environmental regulation delivers a positive
economic benefit, even though regulation imposes additional costs on firms. Furthermore, in
some cities, an increase in the local regulatory level may bring a positive economic return in terms
of aggregate real GDP. These results emerge due to worker demands for better environmental
quality and to let them migrate to an area where air pollution is reduced. In such cases, stricter
regulation works as a centripetal force that attracts workers to the regulated regions, which
coincidentally expands the scale of economic production.
Our approach is not free from shortcomings. First is that our discussion rests only within
a static framework, ignoring the implication of dynamic changes. While our model can be
regarded as a description of a steady state that will be reached in the long-run, this does not
exclude the possibility that the observed results may not hold if dynamics are taken into account.
Another caveat lies in the simplification of environmental quality into a single air pollution
measure. While environmental quality has many dimensions, in the present paper we only care
about ambient quality. Other important dimensions, such as water quality, soil quality, noise,
radioactive pollution, biodiversity, and scenic beauty, are not covered. Moreover, within the
category of the ambient pollution, the argument is simplified to where local air pollution can be
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represented by a single measure, PM2.5 concentration. There are other important forms of air
pollution such as nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, and PM10 (which is a fine
particulate matter that is greater than PM2.5). We also miss the emission of global pollution
that destroy the ozone layers and cause greenhouse gas effects, such as chlorofluorocarbons and
carbon dioxide.
However, our primary interest is in that local air pollution that directly affects people’s health
and their economic behavior, including their choice of residential location. PM2.5 is one of the
most commonly known pollutants that directly affects human lung and cardiovascular systems.
Furthermore, its concentration is closely linked to other pollutants that have similar effects on
human health. Therefore, we believe that focusing on PM2.5 is a reasonable generalization to
avoid overcomplexity and to overcome data limitations, without causing serious biases in our
analysis.
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A Appendix
A.1 An Algorithm to Obtain Counterfactual Equilibrium using Changes
This appendix describes a practical procedure to solve the counterfactual equilibriumof themodel
using the “change,” which is the ratio of the counterfactual equilibrium value of variable G to that
of its original (observed, current equilibrium value).17 We denote the change of variable G as
Ĝ = G
′
G
, where G ′ is the counterfactual value of variable G. The following discussion summarizes
the procedure for solving exogenous changes in trade cost ĝ=8 , manufacturing productivity,
̂",=, services productivity, ̂(,=, and/or strength of local pollution control b̂6,=. Note that we
do not have to know the levels of unobserved exogenous variables consistent with the current
equilibrium, ",=, (,=, and b6,=.
1. Initial guess on factor price changes (skilled wage and Pigouvian tax for pollution), F̂:=
and Ẑ=
2. Solve for %̂",= and %̂(,= consistent with F̂:= and Ẑ= using
2̂= =
[
F̂:=
W:
"
%̂",=
W"
"
%̂(,=
W(
"
]1−X
Ẑ=
X
(33)
%̂",=
−\
=
∑
8
c=8 ĝ=8
−\
2̂8
−\
̂",8
\
(34)
%̂(,= = ̂(,=
−1
F̂:=
W:
(,=
%̂",=
W"
(,= (35)
3. Using the price vectors obtained in the previous step, update the trade shares according to:
ĉ=8 =
(ĝ=8 2̂8)−\ ̂",8
\
%̂",=
−\ (36)
4. Using the vectors of price change obtained by the previous step, update the general price
17. This approach was first proposed byDekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2008), and has been widely used in the literature.
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index %) ,= and expenditure share ĵ 9 ,=, 9 ∈ , ", ( as follows:
%) ,=1−d = j,= + j",=%̂",=1−d + j(,=%̂(,=1−d (37)
j,= = 1%) ,=1−d , ĵ",= = %̂",=
1−d
%) ,=1−d , ĵ(,= = %̂(,=
1−d
%) ,=1−d (38)
5. The expenditures on manufacturing and services goods, as well as their production in the
counterfactual equilibrium are given by:
 ′",= = ĵ",=j",=
(
F̂:=F
:
=!
:
= + FD=!D=
)
+ (1 − X)W"".",= + W"(,=.(,= (39)
. ′",8 =
∑
=
 ′=c
′
=8 (40)
. ′(,8 = 
′
(,8 = ĵ(,=j(,=
(
F̂:=F
:
=!
:
= + FD=!D=
)
+ (1 − X)W(".",= (41)
6. Update land price and emissions:
Â=
1−l
=
Ẑ=
b̂6,=
(42)
/̂",= =
.̂",=
Ẑ=
(43)
/',= = ĵ",=Â= (44)
7. Then update the level of pollution:
 ′= = 5 ( -̄)
(
/",=
′ + /',= ′
) ^ (45)
8. Update labor force distribution for each type C = {:, D}:
!̂C= =
(
4̂C=F̂
C
=
%) ,=−UÂ=U−1) [∑
9
!C
9
!CC
(
4̂C
9
F̂C
9
%̂) , 9
−U
Â=′
U−1
) [ (46)
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where
4̂C= =
exp(−bC ′=)
exp(−bC=)
(47)
9. The skilled wage and total value added (GDP) are then updated by:
F:
′
= =
[
(1 − X)W:
"
+ X
]
. ′
",=
+ W:
(,=
. ′
(,=
!̂:=!
:
=
(48)
and
 ′= = F
:′
= !̂
:
=!
:
= + FD= !̂D=!D= (49)
10. Obtain new values for factor prices F̂:= and Ẑ= from:
F̂:= =
F:
′
=
F:=
(50)
Ẑ= = ̂=
1−l
b̂6,= (51)
11. Iterate 2 to 10 until values converge.
A.2 Details of the Data
Population and value added Our unit of analysis is those prefecture-level cities or counties that
are directly under Provinces plus the four direct-administered municipalities of China as of 2010,
within the Eastern half of the mainland China. This area basically overlaps with the historical
territory of the Han dynasty (B.C. 206 - A.D. 220). Four provinces/autonomous regions, Inner
Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Tibet, and islands (such as Hainan Province) are dropped from the
analysis. We make this choice because the western part of China dropped from the analysis is
economically and demographically very sparse compared to the Eastern half, holding only 4.3
percent of total population while occupyingmore than 51 percent of the land area. We thus follow
other studies such as Baum-Snow et al. (2018) in keeping our focus on the Han part of China.
The area consists of 296 geographical units (270 prefecture-level cities and 26 counties directly
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under the Provinces). The Economic variables, such as the value added of primary, secondary,
and tertiary industries, are taken from the China City Statistical Yearbook and China Region
Economy Statistical Yearbook of 2011 that report their values as of 2010. Employment variables
are constructed benefiting from the online supplementary materials of Baum-Snow et al. (2017)
that originally aggregated the 2010 Population Census at the level of counties. In the county-level
aggregate of the census, the employment in primary, secondary, tertiary industries is provided.
These are summed to the level of prefecture cities as the employment of three industry strata to
obtain the aggregate labor force in the location. Then, we compute the amount of skilled labor
by multiplying the total labor force with the share of population with at least a senior high school
degree. The remaining labor is treated as unskilled.18
PM2.5 Concentration The yearly PM2.5 concentration is computed from raster images provided
by Donkelaar et al. (2016), which are available from fizz.phys.dal.ca/~atmos/martin/
?page_id=140. This is the estimated level of PM2.5 concentration on the surface using the
satellite image of aerosol. Raster images cover all the ground surface of the earth annually
since 2000. A growing number of recent studies use this set of satellite images of PM2.5
to recover the spatio-temporal variations of China’s air pollution, especially for obtaining the
spatially disaggregated situation before 2014 when China started detailed and frequent official
reporting of air pollution.19 There are a few advantages in using this satellite data. Until the
early 2010s, China had reported situations of local air pollution for only a limited number of
cities (only around 100 cities). Since the satellite images by Donkelaar et al. (2016) are the
raster information of 0.01◦× 0.01◦ mesh containing the annual average concentration of PM2.5,
covering all over the world sine 1998, the researchers basically calculate the level of pollution of
18. Combes et al. (2019) define skilled labor as employees received at least technical or vocational training after
completing senior high school, which may be stricter than our definition of the skilled labor. The country-level
aggregates we use do not report the the number of people enrolled in technical or vocational schooling after senior
high school, while the number of people with college degree is available. Therefore, we do not know from our data
how many of those who completed senior high but not college received additional education such as technical and
vocational training.
19. Examples include Chen, Oliva, and Zhang (2017) and Freeman et al. (2017).
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an arbitrary geographical unit. Secondly, as argued by Chen et al. (2013), the official data on air
pollution seem to be incorrect because of manipulation by the local authorities. Satellite images
are generally considered to be more reliable. The spatial distribution of the annual average
concentration of PM2.5 within each prefecture-level unit is depicted in Figure A.1.
Pollutant Emission Inventory We rely on satellite based data on the emission of the ambient
pollutants that are the primary sources of PM2.5. We use the MIX database from MEIC20,
maintained by the researchers from the leading universities in China. The database provides the
gridded (0.25◦× 0.25◦) emission inventory of major pollutants such as SO2, NOG , and primary
PM2.5. The monthly gridded emission inventory is used to construct the annual sum of emission
in each grid and vectorize the raster data by calculating the mean level of emission for each
prefectural polygon.
Particulate matter is formed primarily through combustion of fuels as well as natural sources.
In addition, secondary particulates emerge from other pollutants such as SO2 and NOG , then
finally form the particulate matter observed in the air. When we estimate (26) to obtain coefficient
^ and 5 ( -̃=), we follow Sun et al. (2017) who assume that the PM2.5 concentration in = consists
of the local emission of primary PM2.5 as well as SO2 and NOG emissions that contribute as
secondary sources. For this purpose, therefore, we exploit the emission inventory data of these
important pollutants. Importantly, the MEIC emission inventory provides the local emission of
those pollutants from four different sources; industry, power generation, traffic, and residences.
This allows us to disentangle the emissions from the production side and the residential side,
denoted by /" and /' in the model, respectively. In practice, we calibrate /" by the sum of
the emissions of SO2, NOG , and primary PM2.5 from industry and power generation. For /',
we use the sum of the same set of pollutants from the traffic and residential sources. Table A.1
summarizes the emissions of each pollutants from the four different sources.
20. http://www.meicmodel.org/index.html
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Table A.1: Emission of Major Pollutants from Sources (unit: kilotonne)
Power Industry Residential Transport
SO2 (sum) 7,079.0 19,134.7 3044.9 202.1
(mean) 247.5 66.9 10.6 0.7
NOG (sum) 7,753.8 9,954.0 990.0 6,158.2
(mean) 27.1 34.8 3.5 21.5
Primary PM2.5 (sum) 746.4 5,430.0 4,138.0 442.9
(mean) 2.6 19.0 14.5 1.5
Based on gridded emission inventory dataset from MEIC (http://www.
meicmodel.org/index.html)
Other variables As detailed below, we use a set of control variables in the estimation of labor
supply elasticity, [C , and parameter of disutility from pollution bC . Our identification strategy
use the same instrumental variables and control variables as Baum-Snow et al. (2018), such as
population as well as the share of high school graduates in 1982, and so on. We thus benefit
again from their online appendix. In addition, we also add climate control variables such as
precipitation and temperature since these can simultaneously affect the level of pollution and
people’s residential choice, which is equivalent to the labor supply in themodel. For these climate
variables, we use the satellite images from “TerraClimate” database (Abatzoglou et al. 2018).
21 From the raster files of monthly records, we calculate the annual average precipitation and
temperature within the boundary of each prefecture-level unit.
A.3 Spatial Distribution of Pollution in China
Figure A.1 illustrates the spatial distribution of PM2.5 (particulate matters smaller than 2.5
micrometers) concentration in the populated Eastern half of China (“Han” China) in 2010.
PM2.5 is small particle that is one of the most harmful to the human body. In the area around
Zhongyuan (Central Plain) in the South of Beijing, and including Tianjin, Hebei, Henan, and
Shandong Provinces, the level of pollution is collectively very high. In this area, the long-
21. The data can be downloaded from http://www.climatologylab.org/terraclimate.html
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Figure A.1: PM2.5 Concentration (`/m3) in 2010
Source: Author
Note: Based onDonkelaar et al. (2016), the mean level of PM2.5 within
the boundary of each city is depicted.
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term population-weighted exposure to PM2.5 concentration exceeds 64`6/<3.22 This area also
contains China’s major megalopolises where densely populated cities are clustered across a large
space to accommodatemore than 300million people. By this overlap of pollution and population,
huge numbers of people face significant health risks. The welfare consequences of this unhealthy
spatial distribution are seriously undesirable.
As seen in the introduction, the spatial distribution of PM2.5 concentration is not uniform
across space. Spatially uneven distribution can also be found for the anthropogenic emission of
major ambient pollutants. The maps in Figure A.3 display the spatial patterns of anthropogenic
emission for the threemajor ambient pollutants, sulfur-dioxide (SO2), nitrogen-oxides (NOG), and
the primary emission of PM2.5, produced fromhuman activities.23 Froma visual examination, the
spatial patterns are highly correlated between that of emissions and that of the PM2.5 concentration
level.
The spatial distributions of pollution and emission shown above are highly associatedwith the
distribution of economic activities across space. In short, the agglomerated regions generate a lot
more pollutants and are significantly severely polluted. To see this, we follow the decomposition
proposed by Grossman and Krueger (1995) that separates amount of emissions into (i) scale
effect, (ii) composition effect, and (iii) technique effect. Scale effect is the amount of total
economic production (per area) from a region of a city. Composition is the share of output value
from polluting industry. In our case, this refers to the output share from the secondary sector
(manufacturing and power generation). The technique effect equals to the emission intensity of
that polluting industry, which is the amount of emissions per unit of output value. This reflects
the environmental efficiency of the polluting industries in the region. Furthermore, in models like
this paper presents, the technique effect is proportional to the inverse of the Pigouvian emission
tax imposed on a unit emission, as will be discussed later. More specifically, the decomposition
22. Long-term population-weighted exposure is the average of annual average PM2.5 concentration weighted by
residential population. For reference, the U.S. standard for the long-term population-weighted exposure is 12`6/<3.
23. Primary PM2.5 refers to the emission of particulate matters with a diameter of less than 2.5 micron that is
generated directly from the combustion of fuels and other materials. This is different from the concentration of PM2.5
within a given mass of outdoor air.
54
Figure A.2: Decomposition of Industrial Emission
(a) Emission per km2 (b) Scale Effect
(c) Composition Effect (d) Technique Effect
Source: Author
Note: The emission amount is the sum of SO2, NOG , and primary PM2.5 from industrial and power
generation sources. See Section A.2 for the details of the data definition. Scale effect is in 10,000
RMB per km2 and technique effect is in kilo-tonnes per km2. All the data are from 2010. See
Section A.2 for the details of data used.
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is expressed as an identity for the total industrial emission from region 8 as follows:
/8︸︷︷︸
emission
= .8︸︷︷︸
scale
×
.",8
.8︸︷︷︸
composition
×
/",8
.",8︸︷︷︸
technique
(52)
where /",8 is the total emission from polluting sectors (say, manufacturing) in 8, .8 is the total
economic output in 8 including sectors other than polluting sector (such as services). .",8 is
the polluting sector’s output. This decomposition helps us to capture which of the factors of
economic scale, composition of production, or environmental efficiency (regulation) is more
relevant than others in explaining the spatial distribution of pollution and emission.
Figure A.2 collects the maps showing the decomposition of the industrial emissions that
make up the major part of China’s anthropogenic pollutant emissions. Panel (a) illustrates the
industrial emissions, the sum of SO2, NO2, and primary PM2.5 emissions from manufacturing
and power generation. Panels (b), (c), and (d) show the decomposition of Panel (a), based on
the identity (52). Panel (B) shows the scale effect. Its spatial distribution overlaps with (a),
suggesting that scale matters for these emissions. Cities with denser economic activity tend to
emit larger amount of pollutants. Panel (c) is for the composition. Composition is also positively
correlated with the emission. Emissions are likely in large cities with higher secondary sector
shares. On the contrary, the distribution of technique effect shown in panel (d) does not overlap
with that of emissions. Correlations of each of the three factors with emission are 0.775 (scale),
0.536 (composition), and 0.032 (technique), respectively, which supports the visual observation
from Figure A.2 on the relevance of the scale followed by the composition, as well as the
irrelevance of the technique effect. This is in contrast to the evidence on the development of
U.S. manufacturing firms during recent decades, as illustrated by Shapiro and Walker (2018).
They argue that in the U.S., the technique effect has dominated the overall trend in the emissions
of air pollutants. However, note that the correlation between scale effect and technique effect
is -0.606, meaning that emission intensity is lower where economic density is higher. This can
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also be confirmed from panel (b) and (d) of Figure A.2, where the scale shows a east-high west-
low distribution, while the technique one is west-high east-low. In summary, the geographical
distribution of pollutant emission and pollution in China largely overlaps with the distribution of
economic density. Thus, economic agglomeration, especially industrial agglomeration, means
agglomeration of pollution as well. While the environmental efficiency is expressed as the level
to which the technique effect partially offsets the scale effect, it is not large enough to perfectly
cancel out the scale and composition effect.
A.4 Calibration and Estimation
Bilateral trade cost between cities Bilateral trade cost between locations is not directly ob-
servable in our data. In general, there are two approaches to estimate bilateral trade cost from
available data in the trade and geography literature. The first and traditional approach that has
been mainly used in the international trade literature is to recover it by using the gravity equa-
tion with bilateral trade flow data (Head and Mayer 2004). The theory employed in this paper
also yields a gravity equation that allows the implementation of this method. However, the key
limitation of this method is data availability. While bilateral trade data between every pair of
locations are required, these are largely unavailable for domestic trade. For China, Poncet (2003,
2005) and Tombe and Zhu (2019) are among the researchers using this approach. As the Chinese
domestic trade flow matrices are provided only at the level of Provinces and for a limited number
of years, their analyses are restricted to the Provincial level. The second method is to impute
the trade cost using the travel time (or distance) between the pair of locations, as employed
by Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) and Baum-Snow et al. (2018). Typically, a shortest path
algorithm (e.g. the Dijkstra Algorithm) is used to calculate travel time to reach from one place
to another based on digital maps of transportation infrastructure networks. The calculated travel
time matrix are converted into a bilateral iceberg trade cost matrix using the known parameters
that pin down the relationships between the freight shipment time and the cost. Our focus on the
prefecture-level analysis naturally rules out the first approach because there is no bilateral trade
57
data at this level of granularity in China. Therefore, it is necessary to closely follow the data and
methods employed by Baum-Snow et al. (2018) to recover the trade cost matrix.24 Particularly,
we benefit from the online appendix of Baum-Snow et al. (2018) and use the historical highway
network digital maps as of 2010. The Dijkstra Algorithm is used to compute the shortest paths
between each pair of cities.
International Trade Cost For international trade in the " sector goods, we assume that the
trade cost for city 8 is the trade cost to reach its closest international port multiplied by the border
effect. Let g 9
-8
denote the trade cost between 8 and the RoW. Then, assume that g-8 = g1g?>AC (8)8 ,
where, g1 a common border effect and g?>AC (8)8 is the transportation cost to the closest port from
8. g1 can be recovered by applying the gravity equation as explained in Head and Mayer (2004),
by using China’s national exports E, national imports I,25 total production of manufacturing
goods in RoW, .",- , and China’s total expenditure on manufacturing goods C , as follows:
(g1)−2\ =
EI
(.- − E)(C − I)
(53)
With \ = 5 as will be explained below, we obtain g1 = 1.68.26
Input shares andWages Data on local skilled and unskilled wages are not available. However,
the average wage in each sector at the national level is provided in China Statistical Yearbook.
Average wage in a sector 9 , F 9 is given by F 9 =
F:!:
9
+FD!D
9
!:
9
+!D
9
. Noting that the production
function in both the manufacturing and services sectors is Cobb-Douglass, F:!:
9
= W̃:
9
+ 9 and
F:!D
9
= W̃D
9
+ 9 follow, where+ 9 is the value added of sector 9 and W̃C9 =
WC
9
W:
9
+WD
9
, C ∈ :, D is the type
24. Another novel approach, which has recently emerged, is to use the freight cost quotations provided by logistics
companies. The advantages of using this approach to two other conventional approaches is detailed in Yang (2018).
25. According to the China Statistical Yearbook 2011, China’s manufacturing exports in 2010 were 10,047 billion
RMB and imports were 6,129 billion RMB. We implicitly assume the trade imbalance (positive net export) in
manufacturing goods is offset by the net import of agricultural goods.
26. Baum-Snow et al. (2018) instead set g1 = 1.15 based on the review by Anderson and Wincoop (2004). This
number could be too old to be consistent with the data in 2010, and does not necessarily reflect the situation of
developing countries such as China.
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C share in the value added. Using these relationships, we can compute the skilled labor share
using:
W̃:9 =
F: (F 9 − FD)
F 9 (F: − FD)
(54)
It is assumed that the agricultural sector employs only unskilled labor, hence the national agricul-
tural wage is equal to the national unskilled wage FD . Similarly, it is assumed that the financial
intermediation sector employs only skilled labor and that the national skilled wage F: equalises
to the national wage rate in the financial intermediation sector. With these FD and F: , in addition
to the wage rates in the sub-sectors shown in Table A.5, we can obtain the skilled labor share
for each 9 . Among the sub-sectors whose average wage rates are available in the China Statis-
tical Yearbook, one sub-sector (“Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fishery”) can be
categorized as primary industry ( in the model), four sub-sectors (“mining,” “Manufacturing,”
“Electricity,” and “Construction”) into secondary industry ("), and the remaining fourteen sec-
tors into the tertiary (() industry. Then, we compute the skilled labor share of the  ∈ , ", (
industry is:
W̃: =
∑
9∈ F 9! 9 W̃
:
9∑
9∈ F 9! 9
(55)
Given the input shares of intermediate goods in production of the " and ( industries, namely,
W"
"
, W(
"
, and W"
(,=
in (7) and (14), the input shares of skilled and unskilled labor in these industries
are given by WC
"
= W̃C
"
(1 − W"
"
− W(
"
) and WC
(,=
= W̃C
(
(1 − W"
(,=
).27
At the prefecture-city level, we have neither sectoral wages nor skilled/unskilled wages.
Instead, the value added in each of three industries, denoted here by + ,∀ ∈ , ", (, is used.
We then use the obtained labor shares and value added to recover the skilled and unskilled wages
in city = by:
F:= =
(1−X)W:
"
+X
(1−X) (1−W"
"
−W(
"
)+",= +
W:
(,=
1−W"
(,=
+(,=
!:=
(56)
27. From China’s input-output table as of 2007 provided in China Statistical Yearbook 2011, we set W"
"
= 0.6859
and W(
"
= 0.1004, respectively.
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FD= =
+,= +
(1−X)WD
"
(1−X) (1−W"
"
−W(
"
)+",= +
WD
(,=
1−W"
(,=
+(,=
!D=
(57)
Expenditure share (U) We calibrate U using the expenditure shares of consumers provided in
the China Statistical Yearbook 2011. On average, households in China spend 13% of their total
expenditure on housing, thus we set U = 0.87.28
The elasticity of trade with respect to trade cost (dispersion parameter \) There are
several studies that estimate trade elasticity \. While the majority of these are in the context of
international trade, it is possible to find a number of examples on how to apply these estimates in
the study of domestic trade. Baum-Snow et al. (2018) set \ = 5 while experimenting \ ∈ [3, 10].
Tombe and Zhu (2019) sets \ = 4. Bryan and Morten (2019) use the range 4 to 8 in the
context of domestic trade in Indonesia, referring to Allen and Arkolakis (2014) who use the
value of 8 and Bernard et al. (2003) who found that \ = 4. Caliendo et al. (2018) analyze
the heterogeneous impact of local productivity shocks to aggregate the U.S. economy using the
Ricardian model of trade with disaggregated sectors. They employ the estimates of the trade
elasticity of detailed sectors by Caliendo and Parro (2015) that study the welfare effects of
NAFTA on the U.S. economy. While the elasticity varies a lot across sub-sectors, their main
estimates of the aggregate level elasticity (including agriculture, mining, and manufacturing
sub-sectors) range from 3.29 to 4.55. Gervais and Jensen (2019) estimate \ in the context of
the U.S. domestic trade incorporating services sector trade, finding that the mean value of \ for
manufacturing goods is 8.14. Faber and Gaubert (2019) choose \ = 6.1 based on the estimates
by Adao, Arkolakis, and Esposito (2018) as well as Head and Mayer (2014). In summary, there
seems to be no consensus on the value of \ for domestic trade, but previous studies tend to choose
values between 4 and 8. We take \ = 5 following Baum-Snow et al. (2018).
28. This value is the same as Tombe and Zhu (2019) who also study the equilibrium in 2010.
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Input share of pollutant emission (X) Little is known about the value of X, the input share
of pollutant emission which is also the inverse efficiency of abatement technology. To the best
of our knowledge, Shapiro and Walker (2018) is the only study that provides an estimate for X
consistently with a general equilibrium model with trade like ours. They estimate Xs for detailed
U.S. manufacturing sub-sectors using factory level abatement investment data covering a long
period of time (1990s to 2008). While their estimates of X greatly vary across the sub-sectors,
they report an average for the manufacturing sector as a whole is X = 0.011. Since estimating X
for China is difficult with the currently available data as explained below, we use this value for
the simulation analysis.
Data on abatement expenditure of Chinese manufacturing firms is not available at prefecture-
level granularity. Therefore, it is impossible to choose and estimation strategy similar to that of
Shapiro and Walker (2018). Another possible way to estimate X for China is to use the ratio of
emission levy revenue to manufacturing output, as equation (20), which is a way Shapiro and
Walker (2018) actually avoid. If we assume that X is constant across space, we can technically
recover it only with nationwide total emission levy revenue and the value of industrial output.
While official statistics of the emission levy revenue are available from the China Environment
Yearbook, it should be noted that the levy revenue may cover only a fraction of the wide range
of expenditure that the term Z8/",8 in (20) represents. In fact, the ratio of the total emission
levy to industrial output in China is less than 0.00001. If the estimate of Shapiro and Walker
(2018) for U.S. manufacturing firms is correct, this means that abatement efficiency of Chinese
manufacturing firms is 100 times superior to that of the U.S. firms, which is simply incredible.29
According to a dataset for international comparison by the OECD (https://stats.oecd.org/
Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ENV_ENVPOLICY), the ratio of environment related tax to industrial
29. The system of environmental control is complicated. In China, along with emission levies on designated
pollutants, the government sets the targets for reducing the aggregate emissions of selected pollutants. For achieving
the target, local governments in China uses variety of policy instruments. For example, local governments sometimes
order polluting plants to shut down or relocate. Polluting firms implicitly pay substantial costs for lobbying (or even
bribing officials as reported by Rooij (2006)) in order to avoid such sanctions. Therefore, it seems appropriate to
assume there is more implicit expenditure than actually observed as emission levies that the manufacturing firms in
China spend for realising the observed combination of emission and production.
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output is around 1 percent which can also support our choice of X, even if the assumptions leading
to this number are not clear.
Elasticity of substitution among three category of goods (d) There is only limited guidance
in the literature on the appropriate value of d, the elasticity of substitution among the three
categories of goods. As pointed out by Faber and Gaubert (2019), d should be smaller than the
elasticity of substitution between the varieties within the same category of goods. In our case,
this means that d ≤ \ + 1 should be satisfied. We search for the value of d in this range such that
the model derived consumption expenditure share of manufacturing goods at the national level
is equal to the observed data. This exercise gives the value d = 3.45 that is used throughout the
analyses in this paper.
labor supply elasticity ([C ) and disutility from pollution (bC ) We estimate the elasticity of
labor supply of each type of worker ([C ) as well as the parameters of the welfare impact of
pollution (bC ) that are consistent with our model. Equation (31) is estimated to recover [C and
bC consistent with the model. The existing literature provides guidance on the identification
concerns and possible solutions.30 As discussed in Faber and Gaubert (2019), OLS estimation of
labor supply elasticity, the coefficient on the real wage term, or aggregate real factor income ln ,̃ C=
in our case, can be downward biased due to unobserved confounding factors in labor demand
and supply. In addition, estimates for bC can also be biased because there is the possibility of
omitted variable bias and reverse causality. For example, as the same as the estimate of the real
wage term, unobserved labor demand shock can be either positively or negatively correlated with
pollution, =, because that can cause more emission as well as strengthen regulations through
the local government’s endogenous response (28). Furthermore, local amenities consisting C=,
such as climate characteristics, may simultaneously affect = and !C=.
To address these identification concerns, we use the set of instruments and controls that Baum-
Snow et al. (2018) use to estimate the causal impact of 2010 road infrastructure on prefecture’s
30. See Faber and Gaubert (2019), Fajgelbaum et al. (2019), and Fajgelbaum and Gaubert (2019).
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demographic and economic outcomes. They instrument 2010 road infrastructure measures
by those of 1962. More specifically, in their main specification, their variables of interests
are the log efficiency road unit and the log time to nearest international port, both reflecting
infrastructure quality in 2010. The efficiency road unit is the length of road infrastructure
weighted by average travel speed within a 450km radius of each prefecture minus the weighed
road length within own prefecture. The time to the nearest international port is the shortest
travel time to the closest international port out of nine candidates. They instruments these 2010
infrastructure variables by their 1962 counterparts, arguing that these instruments are exogenous
to 2010 demographic and economic variables conditional on several historical and geophysical
controls.31 Based on Baum-Snow et al. (2018)’s argument, we instrument ln ,̃ C= and = by
these 1962 variables and an exogenous climate variable. The rationale for instrumenting ln ,̃ C= is
straightforward. 1962 infrastructure variables predict current employment, wages, and industrial
composition well but they are not correlated with unobservable contemporaneous productivity
and amenity shocks. The unobserved shocks that simultaneously affect 1962 infrastructure
placement and contemporaneous productivity are assumed to be eliminated by the set of historical
and geographical controls. For pollution, we instrument this with the SO2 emission from power
plants located in the upper-wind direction of the city. The constructed instruments are similar to
the IV2 of Freeman et al. (2017). Instead of coal consumption by upper-wind thermal electricity
plant, we use the emission of SO2 by power plants, due to data availability. Our IV is the sum
of SO2 emission from power plants with in the 90 degree-sector of 500 km radius from the city,
minus the emissions within own city.
The first stage results are shown in Table A.3. The three variables of interest, the level of
PM2.5 concentration, the log of ,̃ C for C = {:, D} are regressed on the same set of the instruments
31. Baum-Snow et al. (2018) justify that 1962 variables are exogenous to the contemporaneous shocks determining
2010 demographic and economic outcomes based on the historical context of China’s road development during
the pre-economic reform period. In 1962 when China was under the socialist planning economy before economic
liberalisation in the 1980s, the roads were primarily designed to move agricultural goods between villages using
non-motorised vehicles. Therefore, the road development then did not concerned the production and logistics for
the manufacturing goods using late 20th century technologies. At the same time, despite not being designed for
the motorised vehicles, the existence of 1962 roads provided the right-of-the-way for the alignment of the highways
whose planning and construction started in 1990s.
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and control variables. The three variables on the top of the table are the instruments.32 Table
A.4 shows the second stage results. The first two columns are for the OLS estimates, while the
column (3) and (4) show the results of IV estimations. As expected, the OLS estimates on the
real wage terms (ln ,̃ C ) are downward biased compared to the IV estimates. The implied values
of [C from our IV estimates are [: = 3.52 and [D = 1.16, respectively. Interestingly, our IV
estimates on PM2.5 are very close to the estimates of the impact of PM2.5 level on the migration
of skilled and unskilled labor by Chen, Oliva, and Zhang (2017) which are -0.0093 for skilled
labor and -0.0047 for unskilled labor. Given these estimates, the implied values are b: = 0.013
and bD = 0.0095.
Coefficient of policy elasticity to GDP (l) As in (28), the elasticity of pollution control policy
with respect to GDP is 1 − l. Taking the log of (28) and noting that Z= = X .",=/",= , we have
ln Z= = V0 + (1 − l) ln= + ln b6= (58)
We estimate l by OLS estimation of (58). Endogeneity concerns come with any omitted
variables that are simultaneously related to Z= and =. Specifically, the model implies two
reverse causalities that flow from Z= to =. First, the lowered pollution that is induced by
higher Z= will increase labor supply from the migration equation (30), then positively affect
=. In contrast, high Z= increases the production costs in the manufacturing sector (10) and
may contract total value added =. To address these concerns, we instrument ln= by the
historical market access that is proxied by the 1962 road efficiency unit and the 1962 time to
nearest port. Additionally, to control for any shocks that might be simultaneously correlated with
1962 infrastructure variables and ln b6= , we include a Province capital dummy, an environmental
priority city dummy, the historical level of pollution that is proxied by the level of PM2.5 annual
average concentration in 1999, the log of the distance to coast, and four variables that capture
32. Given that the 1962 log road efficiency unit is not significant for ln ,̃ : and ln ,̃D as shown in Table A.3, we
also estimate the version without this instrumental variable. The second stage results are qualitatively the same.
64
1982 demography, as shown in Table A.2. Provincial capital has specific political and economic
importance and it is reasonable to assume that their status as Provincial capitals simultaneously
affected the 1962 infrastructure placement as well as the unobserved shocks to the current
environmental regulations captured in b6. In our sample cities, there are 105 environmental
priority cities whose environmental performance are reported in the annual China Environment
Yearbook. Again, priority cities should have a specific shock in b6 whichmight be also correlated
with the 1962 infrastructure variables if economic development after 1962 affected the probability
of them being chosen as a priority city.
The results are shown in Table A.2. Our IV estimate on the log of GDP is 0.544 which
implies that l = 0.466.
Elasticity of PM2.5 to emission (^) The relationship is specified as in (26). We estimate the
logarithm of the equation by proxying = using the aerial concentration of PM2.5(`6/2<3) and
/= using the total emission of SO2, NOG , and the primary PM2.5 emissions from both production
and consumption sources (/" and /'). In turn, ^ is estimated by OLS and the value obtained
is ^ = 0.16. The exponential of the constant term plus the residual recovers b6= .
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Table A.2: Estimation of the Environmental Regulation Equation
OLS IV
(1) (2)
log of GDP, [1 − l] 0.645∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗
(0.096) (0.270)
Provincial Capital −0.110 −0.073
(0.170) (0.207)
Priority City −0.243∗∗∗ −0.207
(0.093) (0.132)
log of PM2.5, 1999 0.103 0.129
(0.100) (0.125)
Log km to coast −0.167∗∗∗ −0.182∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.052)
Log prefecture population, 1982 −0.468∗∗∗ −0.384
(0.137) (0.245)
Log city centre population, 1982 −0.099 −0.119
(0.085) (0.099)
Share of population with high school, 1982 0.174 0.249
(0.366) (0.395)
Share of population in manufacturing, 1982 0.507 0.811
(0.501) (0.852)
Constant 4.043∗∗∗ 4.591∗∗
(1.064) (1.881)
Observations 283 283
R2 0.523 0.520
Adjusted R2 0.507 0.504
Source: Author
Note: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in the parentheses. In the
IV estimation, the log of GDP is instrumented by log 1962 road efficiency unit and
log 1962 time to nearest port as in Baum-Snow et al. (2018). ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01
66
Table A.3: First Stage Estimates for the Labor Supply Equation
Dependent variable:
PM2.5 ln ,̃ : ln ,̃D
(1) (2) (3)
Log road efficiency unit, 1962 7.514∗∗∗ −0.057 −0.115
(2.363) (0.141) (0.126)
Log time to nearest port, 1962 −2.715∗∗∗ −0.292∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗
(1.002) (0.060) (0.053)
Log power plant emission in upwind 0.329∗∗ −0.003 −0.002
(0.141) (0.008) (0.008)
Provincial Capital 4.586∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗
(2.253) (0.135) (0.120)
Log prefecture population, 1982 6.823∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗
(1.899) (0.114) (0.101)
Log city centre population, 1982 −2.048 −0.105 −0.131
(1.493) (0.089) (0.080)
Share prefecture population with high school, 1982 1.253 0.833∗∗ 0.750∗∗∗
(5.420) (0.324) (0.289)
Share prefecture population in manufacturing, 1982 −22.326∗∗ 3.175∗∗∗ 2.273∗∗∗
(8.841) (0.529) (0.471)
Log prefecture area −9.017∗∗∗ 0.117 0.080
(1.431) (0.086) (0.076)
Log prefecture area 0.520 −0.085∗ −0.062
(0.783) (0.047) (0.042)
Log km to coast 1.407∗∗∗ −0.016 −0.013
(0.495) (0.030) (0.026)
West Region −0.283 −0.185∗ −0.179∗∗
(1.668) (0.100) (0.089)
East Region 2.973∗ 0.070 0.071
(1.653) (0.099) (0.088)
Log city centre roughness −3.233∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.016
(0.591) (0.035) (0.031)
Log prefecture roughness −2.298∗∗∗ −0.035 −0.041
(0.496) (0.030) (0.026)
Log precipitation −0.007∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Log mean temperature 0.001 0.032∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.007) (0.006)
Constant 15.944 −0.832 0.874
(37.515) (2.243) (1.998)
Observations 283 283 283
R2 0.772 0.742 0.740
Adjusted R2 0.757 0.726 0.723
Residual Std. Error (df = 265) 8.072 0.483 0.430
F Statistic (df = 17; 265) 52.646∗∗∗ 44.874∗∗∗ 44.285∗∗∗
Source: Author
Note: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in the parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.4: Estimating the Labor Supply Equation
Dependent variable:
ln !:= ln !D= ln !:= ln !D=
OLS OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PM2.5, [−bC[C/([C + 1)] 0.002 −0.001 −0.010∗∗ −0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
ln ,̃ : , [[:/([: + 1)] 0.706∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.141)
ln ,̃D , [[D/([D + 1)] 0.521∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.138)
Provincial capital 0.242∗∗∗ −0.102 0.258∗∗∗ −0.092
(0.055) (0.063) (0.084) (0.063)
Log prefecture population, 1982 0.370∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.100) (0.096) (0.100)
Log city centre population, 1982 −0.113∗∗∗ −0.039 −0.142∗∗∗ −0.047
(0.041) (0.036) (0.045) (0.036)
Share prefecture population, with high school, 1982 0.332∗∗ −0.044 0.339∗ −0.036
(0.158) (0.172) (0.181) (0.170)
Share prefecture population, in manufacturing, 1982 0.294 −1.091∗∗∗ −0.415 −1.265∗∗∗
(0.332) (0.386) (0.590) (0.424)
Log prefecture area 0.092∗∗ 0.004 −0.060 −0.040
(0.042) (0.042) (0.066) (0.055)
Log city centre area 0.029 0.011 0.042 0.014
(0.022) (0.021) (0.026) (0.021)
Log km to coast −0.014 −0.007 0.018 0.002
(0.013) (0.014) (0.021) (0.014)
West Region −0.134∗∗∗ 0.096∗ −0.139∗∗ 0.093∗
(0.049) (0.055) (0.062) (0.056)
East Region −0.210∗∗∗ −0.052 −0.169∗∗∗ −0.038
(0.039) (0.039) (0.047) (0.040)
Log city centre roughness 0.031 0.042 −0.010 0.031
(0.027) (0.039) (0.030) (0.038)
Log prefecture roughness 0.022 −0.013 −0.005 −0.021
(0.014) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021)
Log precipitation −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001 −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0001∗
(0.00004) (0.00005) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Log mean temperature 0.006∗ 0.005 0.004 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Constant −3.062∗∗∗ −1.473∗ −2.324∗∗ −1.284
(0.863) (0.817) (0.981) (0.824)
Observations 283 283 283 283
R2 0.923 0.885 0.907 0.883
Adjusted R2 0.918 0.878 0.902 0.876
Residual Std. Error (df = 266) 0.237 0.248 0.260 0.249
F Statistic (df = 16; 266) 199.438∗∗∗ 127.470∗∗∗
Source: Author
Note: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in the parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
68
Ta
bl
e
A
.5
:I
m
pu
te
d
Sk
ill
ed
Sh
ar
e
in
th
e
La
bo
rI
nc
om
e
A
cr
os
sS
ec
to
rs
D
et
ai
le
d
Se
ct
or
C
at
eg
or
iz
at
io
n
Av
er
ag
e
W
ag
e
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t
Im
pu
te
d
Sk
ill
ed
(Y
ua
n)
(1
0,
00
0
pe
op
le
)
Sh
ar
e
(
W
: 9
W
: 9
+W
D 9
)
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
,F
or
es
try
,A
ni
m
al
H
us
ba
nd
ry
an
d
Fi
sh
er
y
F
16
71
7
37
5.
7
0.
00
0
M
in
in
g
M
44
19
6
56
2.
0
0.
70
6
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
M
30
91
6
36
37
.2
0.
36
6
Pr
od
uc
tio
n
an
d
D
ist
rib
ut
io
n
of
El
ec
tri
ci
ty
et
c.
M
47
30
9
31
0.
5
0.
75
9
C
on
str
uc
tio
n
M
27
52
9
12
67
.5
0.
22
6
Tr
affi
c,
Tr
an
sp
or
t,
St
or
ag
e
an
d
Po
st
S
40
46
6
63
1.
1
0.
63
3
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
Tr
an
sm
is
si
on
,C
om
pu
te
rS
er
vi
ce
s
S
64
43
6
18
5.
8
0.
95
6
W
ho
le
sa
le
an
d
Re
ta
il
Tr
ad
es
S
33
63
5
53
5.
1
0.
45
7
H
ot
el
sa
nd
C
at
er
in
g
Se
rv
ic
es
S
23
38
2
20
9.
2
0.
00
0
Fi
na
nc
ia
lI
nt
er
m
ed
ia
tio
n
S
70
14
6
47
0.
1
1.
00
0
Re
al
Es
ta
te
S
35
87
0
21
1.
6
0.
52
2
Le
as
in
g
an
d
B
us
in
es
sS
er
vi
ce
s
S
39
56
6
31
0.
1
0.
61
4
Sc
ie
nt
ifi
c
Re
se
ar
ch
,T
ec
hn
ic
al
Se
rv
ic
e
S
56
37
6
29
2.
3
0.
87
8
M
an
ag
em
en
to
fW
at
er
C
on
se
rv
an
cy
,E
nv
iro
nm
en
t
S
25
54
4
21
8.
9
0.
12
7
Se
rv
ic
es
to
H
ou
se
ho
ld
sa
nd
O
th
er
Se
rv
ic
es
S
28
20
6
60
.2
0.
25
7
Ed
uc
at
io
n
S
38
96
8
15
81
.8
0.
60
0
H
ea
lth
,S
oc
ia
lS
ec
ur
ity
an
d
So
ci
al
W
el
fa
re
S
40
23
2
63
2.
5
0.
62
8
C
ul
tu
re
,S
po
rts
an
d
En
te
rta
in
m
en
t
S
41
42
8
13
1.
4
0.
65
3
Pu
bl
ic
M
an
ag
em
en
ta
nd
So
ci
al
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
S
38
24
2
14
28
.5
0.
58
3
So
ur
ce
:A
ut
ho
r
B
as
ed
on
C
hi
na
St
at
ist
ic
al
Ye
ar
bo
ok
20
11
(T
ab
le
E0
40
5
an
d
E0
41
5)
C
at
eg
or
iz
at
io
n:
F
=
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
,M
=
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
,S
=
Tr
ad
ed
Se
rv
ic
es
,H
=
H
ou
si
ng
Se
rv
ic
es
.
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
as
su
m
ed
to
em
pl
oy
10
0%
un
sk
ill
ed
la
bo
r.
W
e
as
su
m
e
ho
te
la
nd
ca
te
rin
g
se
ct
or
is
th
e
en
try
po
in
ts
ec
to
rf
or
ru
ra
la
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l
un
sk
ill
ed
w
or
ke
rw
ho
se
w
ag
e
ra
te
is
at
th
e
in
di
ffe
re
nt
le
ve
lc
om
pa
re
d
w
ith
ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
lw
ag
es
ta
ki
ng
ur
ba
n
liv
in
g
co
st
in
to
ac
co
un
t.
W
e
as
su
m
e
th
at
F
D
=
F
0
6
A
82
D
;C
D
A
4
an
d
F
:
=
F
5
8=
0
=
2
4
,w
he
re
F
D
is
un
sk
ill
ed
w
ag
e
an
d
F
:
is
sk
ill
ed
w
ag
e,
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
Th
en
,f
or
gi
ve
n
se
ct
or
w
ag
e,
F
9
,t
he
sk
ill
ed
w
or
ke
rs
sh
ar
e
in
la
bo
ri
nc
om
e
in
th
e
se
ct
or
is
im
pu
te
d
by
W
: 9
W
: 9
+W
D 9
=
F
:
(F
9
−F
D
)
F
9
(F
:
−F
D
).
69
Figure A.3: Emission of Pollutants from Production and Consumption Sources
(a) SO2 from production (kilo-tonne/km2) (b) SO2 from consumption (kilo-tonne/km2)
(c) NO2 from production (kilo-tonne/km2) (d) NO2 from consumption (kilo-tonne/km2)
(e) Primary PM2.5 from production
(kilo-tonne/km2)
(f) Primary PM2.5 from consumption
(kilo-tonne/km2)
Source: Author
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Figure A.4: Illustration of the Spatial Effect of Policy Shock from Wuhan
(a) Industrial Emission (b) total Emission (c) PM2.5
(d) Skilled labor (e) Unskilled labor (f) Exposure
(g) Skilled Real Wage (h) Unskilled Real Wage (i) Scale Effect
(j) Composition Effect (k) Manufacturing Price (%" ) (l) Services Price (%()
Source: Author
Note: The maps depict elasticities computed against a 10 percent change in the regulation parameter of Wuhan
(b6
,Dℎ0=
). The red color indicates the positive computed elasticities, while the blues indicate negative ones. The
midpoint of the colour palette is set to zero.
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Figure A.5: Illustration of the Spatial Effect of Policy Shock from Deyang
(a) Industrial Emission (b) total Emission (c) PM2.5
(d) Skilled labor (e) Unskilled labor (f) Exposure
(g) Skilled Real Wage (h) Unskilled Real Wage (i) Scale Effect
(j) Composition Effect (k) Manufacturing Price (%" ) (l) Services Price (%()
Source: Author
Note: The maps depict elasticities computed against a 10 percent change in the regulation parameter of Deyang
(b6
4H0=6
). The red color indicates the positive computed elasticities, while the blues indicate negative ones. The
midpoint of the colour palette is set to zero.
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Abstruct (in Japanese) 
要約 
本稿では、生産・消費活動に伴い発生する大気汚染を明示的に内生化した空間均衡
モデルを構築した。本モデルには、異なるタイプの労働者（熟練労働者と未熟練労働
者）を導入し、大気汚染に対して異なる選好を持つ両者が国内を移住できると仮定し
た場合の、地域的な環境政策の効果について考察した。2010年時点での中国のデータ
に対してモデルのパラメータを較正（キャリブレーション）してシミュレーションを
行ったところ、地域的に厳格な環境規制がその地域への「向心力（centripetal force）」
として働き、労働者や生産活動を当該地域に引き付け、同時に当該地域及び国全体の
汚染排出を削減しうる場合があることが分かった。この結果は、地域的な環境規制を
「遠心力（centrifugal force）」と見る従来の考え方とは異なるもので、生産要素（労
働力）の移動などを明示的に導入したことで得られたものである。続いて、中国全体
で 10 パーセントの工業大気汚染排出を減らすために、削減責任を地域的にどのように
割り当てるべきかを考察した。その結果は、少数の豊かな地域に削減責任を集中させ
る方が、より平等に責任配分をするよりも厚生面および経済生産面で優れたパフォー
マンスを上げ得ることが分かった。 
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